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ABSTRACT 
The maintenance of price stability is the Bundesbank's ultimate 
objective. The memory of two hyperinflations within a 30-year period 
has made the fight against inflation of paramount social and political 
importance. In the Bank's view inflation engenders uncertainties 
which may jeopardise capital investment on which the competitiveness 
of German industry as well as full employment and economic growth 
depends. 
The Bundesbank pursues this goal by setting the marginal cost 
of central bank money required by the banks to finance their expansion. 
Thus, both the liquidity of the banking system and the cost of borrowing 
are controlled . This does not necessarily mean that the banks' loan 
rate of interest is the Bundesbank's intermediate target. In fact, 
the Bank does not have one single intermediate target. Since the 
Bank's views of the monetary sector are manifested in the form of 
an interlocking system of financial variables, the selection of an 
appropriate intermediate target depends on the actual economic situation. 
In this context, the money stock supply {M3) is seen by the 
Bundesbank as functionally related to bank lending and the accumulation 
of long-term funds at the banks (monetary capital formation). An 
increase in interest rates would reduce bank lending, stimulate monetary 
capital formation and hence reduce the money stock supply (M3). 
In addition, it would check the utilisation of the money stock supply. 
This is seen as important because once money has entered the system 
it may generate unacceptable expenditure flows. To control the growth 
of the money stock supply, the Bundesbank relies on monetary capital 
formation, because small stocks of public debt rule out large-scale 
open market operations. In the Bank's view monetary policy should 
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aim at keeping the banks• loan rate of interest as closely as possible 
to the natural rate. 
Lags in this Wicksellian transmission process may arise if the 
banks have ample margins between their loan and deposit rates when 
a restrictive monetary policy is implemented. As deposit rates adjust 
sooner than loan rates to a change in market rates, this also blunts 
the immediate impact of a policy change. 
The Bundesbank favours flexible rates of exchange in order to 
safeguard the financial system against inflows of foreign capital. 
It would welcome an appreciation of the 0-Mark as a contribution to 
price stability, even though it could result in a loss of employment 
and exports as it stimulates German business to invest abroad. 
Furthermore, the Bank aims at constraining the monetary disturbances 
arising from public sector deficits and collective wage bargaining 
by means of its annual monetary growth target. This should serve 
as a signal to non-banks, which they are supposed to internalise in 
their decision-making. 
During the review period, the effectiveness of these safeguards 
was small as witnessed by inflows of foreign capital, large public 
sector deficits and excessive wage settlements. Moreover, the Bundesbank 
has been confronted with the development of parallel markets, in 
particular the Eurocurrency markets, in which borrowers can avoid the 
effects of its constraints. 
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CHAPTER ONE DEFINITION AND DISCOVERY OF A QUALITATIVE REACTION FUNCTION 
1.1 Purpose of this study 
The purpose of this study is to derive the Deutsche Bundesbank•s 
overall concept of monetary policy from its publications in the 
period 1972-1979. Such an overall concept may be described 
specifically as a central bank•s view on the relationship between 
the monetary sector and the real economy or its basic belief as 
to how the monetary sector should be controlled in order to achieve 
the well-known ultimate goals of economic policy: price stability, 
economic growth, equilibrium in the balance of payments and full 
employment. 
Since a central bank must react to on-going developments 
not only in financial markets but also in the real economy, it is 
important to know from which viewpoint it frames its policies. 
The Bundesbank•s concept will be assessed with special reference 
to those variables which it believes are best suited to transmit 
its policies to the real economy. Inasmuch as monetary theories 
diverge markedly with regard to the transmission process, the 
actual preferences of an important central bank will be of interest 
to monetary economists. 
This is, therefore, a case study aimed at identifying the 
Bundesbank•s qualitative reaction function as revealed by its 
publications during a recent period. The starting year of 1972 
was chosen as it was the first year after the so-called Smithsonian Agreement 
of 20 December 1971, which provided for a re-alignment of exchange 
rates after the period of floating which had followed the suspension 
of the U.S.A. dollar•s convertibility into gold on 15 August 1971. 
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1.2 The distinction between theoretical and practical analysis 
The broad concept of a central bank's understanding of its role 
with regard to the monetary sector should not be confused with a monetary 
theory. 
Theoretical analysis is at one remove from practical experience. 
Thus, monetary theory will analyse systematically money and its functioning, 
from an economic point of view, by isolating it conceptually from its 
usual context in life. This procedure implies that theoretical work 
will always have a somewhat hypothetical character. 
Naturally, monetary theory will take account of the specific 
character of the institutions whose financial behaviour it analyses. 
A central bank, for example, will not shape its policies so as to 
maximise the profits of the trading banks, but rather to achieve monetary 
stability and other economic goals for the country as a whole. 
In contrast to monetary theorists, central banks are always confronted 
with a total situation and not just with its economic aspect in abstraction. 
This is not to deny that policymakers draw on the results of theoretical 
analysis. What is denied is that devising and implementing monetary 
policy is a theoretical activity. It is rather a set of pragmatic 
actions in a market place. The analysis which central banks carry 
out in preparation of their policy decisions is based upon a broad 
concept of the functioning of money in a particular institutional setting. 
This broad concept is influenced by prevailing views on the nature of 
society, the task of government and so on. In Western Germany, the 
views of liberal economists like Walter Eucken have exerted a powerful 
influence on economic policies. Briefly, they entail a distinction 
between the institutional framework or the economic order and the 
economic process. The State should confine itself to setting the 
conditions for economic life, but should refrain from directing the 
economic process. This has become known as the concept of the 
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Social Market Economy [1]. An independent central bank equipped with 
sufficient powers to enforce price stability through the operation 
of markets is an essential element of such a social market economy. 
In the next chapter this institutional setting will be further explored. 
1.3 The transmission process of monetary policy 
Since it is proposed to study the Bundesbank•s concept in particular 
on the basis of its choice of intermediate variables, that is variables 
which are believed to transmit the effects of policy instruments to 
the real economy, some brief notes on the literature about the transmission 
process are required. Table 1.1 sets out the main views. 
Table 1.1 Main theories of Transmission process of monetary policy 
Theory 
Credit system 
approach 
Neo-quantity 
theory 
Neo- Keynesian 
theory 
Credit 
availability 
Liquidity 
theory 
Leading theorist 
Wicksell, Hayek 
Friedman; Brunner 
& Meltzer; 
D. Patinkin 
Tobin 
Roosa, 
Due sen berry 
0. Veit, 
G. Schmtilders 
A. Oberhauser 
C. KBhler 
R. S. Sayers 
Intermediate 
variable 
Other 
characteristics 
Loan rate/ Austrian theory 
natural rate of of capital 
interest 
Money supply, 
monetary base; 
(desired real 
balances vs. 
actual balances) 
Rate of inte-
rest, (yield 
on equity/costs 
of reproducing 
capital assets) 
Portfolio balance 
theory 
Portfolio balance 
theory 
Rate of interest, 
credit 
rationing 
Banks• 
secondary 
1 iquidity 
Distinction between 
objective and 
subjective liquidity 
[1] Stolper, W. F. and Roskamp, K. W. [1979]. Also Watrin, C. [1979]. 
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In Chapter three it is shown that the Bundesbank ' s views have 
been strongly influenced by elements of both the credit system approach 
and the liquidity theory of money. Since one of the leading liquidity 
theorists in Germany, Prof. Claus K~hler, has been a member of the 
Bundesbank Directorate since 1975, a brief explanation of his version 
of the liquidity theory is in order. The theory of the credit system 
approach is discussed in more detail in Chapter three. In K~hler's 
view [2], economic policy should make sure that the demand for real 
output does not exceed potential real supply. Monetary policy, in 
particular, should limit the amount of new loans made available to non-
banks, such that the volume of demand corresponds to the possibilities 
of supply of output. The amount of demand deposits and other sources 
of finance, which are already available to economic subjects, should 
be taken into account when the permissible amount of new loans is calculated. 
This approach considers firstly the factors determining the supply 
of output, such as the potential labour force (defined as the number 
of man-hours which can be used per period), the ratio of the existing 
capital stock to the potential labour force and the capital/output 
ratio, assuming the capital stock is optimally used. Potential production 
should then be compared with the real national product. Allowing for 
unavoidable price increases (e.g. increases in import prices), the 
ratio of real national product to potential production would indicate 
whether monetary policy should be stimulating or restricting the supply 
of finance. The shape of monetary policy measures should, however, 
depend on the behaviour, both of banks and non-banks, with regard to 
their financial assets (liquidity). 
For the banking system as a whole the critical variable is the 
amount of potential "central bank money" available to finance an expansion 
[2] K~hler, Claus [1977], pp.323-330. 
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of bank lending (secondary liquidity)[3]. The central bank should 
control, therefore, the banks' access to central bank money. K~hler 
is not dogmatic about intermediate variables, because basically all 
monetary variables are interrelated. Nevertheless, he prefers the volume 
of bank lending, for the following reasons: 
a. It is closely related to the amount of cash, excess reserve 
holdings and other sources of central bank money available to 
the banks. 
b. It is influenced by all factors, concerning both banks and non-
banks, which together constitute the financial process. This 
covers the demand for bank loans, expectations, the liquidity 
of non-banks, profitability of new investment projects etc. 
c. Bank lending is one of the main sources of money creation. 
The recipients of the loans will draw on them to effect payments. 
As it depends on the dispositions of the recipients of these 
payments how the expansion of bank lending will eventually 
be reflected in bank liabilities, bank lending is more 
readily controllable than the money supply. 
d. As bank assets, bank loans are less affected by exogenous factors 
than bank liabilities such as the money stock. 
The German economist Oberhauser [4] has made a similar analysis, 
in which he compares the supply of central bank money with the demand 
for bank loans as the latter originates in the real economy. If the 
central bank were to provide whatever amount of central bank money 
the banks required, the demand for bank loans would determine the 
[3] The term central bank money was established in 1973; it is defined 
and discussed in detail in Chapter three. 
[4] Oberhauser, A. [1977], pp.208-211. 
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volume of bank lending. On the other hand, if the central bank were 
to curb the supply of central bank money, then the banks would have 
to curtail their lending, so that the demand for bank loans would be 
constrained by supply. According to the liquidity theory of money, 
the demand for bank loan s originates in the real sector. This, of 
course, is basically the view of the •needs of trade• or banking theory 
of money. The liquidity theory, however, also accepts the truth of 
the currency principle that it may be necessary to constrain the demand 
for bank loans and the creation of money. Since, in practice, both 
factors will operate with varying strength there is a two-way causality 
between the real economy and the financial sector. 
1.4 How to discover a qualitative reaction function 
The list of intermediate variables given in Table 1.1 could serve 
as a guide to the study of the Bundesbank•s publications. Which inter-
mediate variables does the Bundesbank preferfor the transmission of its 
policies and how does it set out to control them? This raises the 
a priori question whether the Bundesbank has indeed a concept of intermediate 
variables which corresponds to the theoretical concept as developed by 
Brunner and Meltzer [5]. 
Another possibility is to look for basic principles which are 
being adhered to by the Bank. 
A third approach to uncover the Bundesbank•s qualitative reaction 
function is to find out how it conceives of the functions of money. 
Each of these will be discussed briefly. 
[5] Brunner, K. and Meltzer, A. [1969]. 
- 7 -
1.5 The theory of economic policy 
Tinbergen [6] introduced a distinction between policy instruments 
and policy targets, with a view to examining how economic policy targets 
bear upon the use of policy instruments. For example, what sort of 
policy instruments should a central bank use to stabilise the price 
level? Brunner and Meltzer [7] have expanded Tinbergen's model by 
incorporating some intermediate steps between policy instruments and 
final goals, as set out in Figure 1.1. In view of the popularity of 
Brunner and Meltzer's innovations, this might well be called the theory 
of intermediate policy variables. 
Figure 1.1 
Policy Instruments and Targets 
Policy instruments ~ Operating ~ Intermediate targets Uitimate target ~ ~ targets 
t Policy indicator l J 
' 
--7) Direction of causation 
Instrument variables are assumed to be under the control of the 
monetary authorities. They are aimed at an operating target, which is, 
therefore, also able to be substantially manipulated by the central 
bank. In view of the uncertain structure of the transmission process, 
intermediate variables are to take the place of ultimate variables, 
being predictably related to them. The relationship could take the 
[6] Tinbergen, J . [1952]. 
[7] Ibid. 
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form of a stable demand for money function or a predictable term 
structure of interest rates [8]. The choices made in this respect 
by a central bank would give a clear indication of its theoretical 
orientation. 
A problem is that intermediate targets are influenced not only 
by the operating target, but also by the decisions of other policy-
makers. For this reason, a central bank requires a policy indicator 
to judge the thrust of its policies reasonably quickly. Preferably, 
a policy indicator should only be affected by monetary policies and 
should be quickly measurable. 
In Brunner and Meltzer•s view, as represented in Figure 1.1, 
the monetary authorities are able to handle ultimate variables by 
remote control via intermediate variables, inasmuch as the latter are 
interchangeable with the former. Clearly, this requires that the 
selected intermediate variables are capable of being controlled by 
policy instruments. Basically, the monetary authorities and their 
policy instruments are thought of as exogenous to the economic process 
and, therefore, able to control this process. 
The question is whether this is really true. 
If policy instruments were part of the economic process, the 
causality might not be as deterministic as suggested by Brunner and 
Meltzer•s theory. 
Interestingly, Brunner and Meltzer•s view corresponds well with 
W. Eucken•s distinction between data and economic process [9]. Data 
are all factors which control the working of the economic process by 
being exogenous to it. Government policies, for example, trigger 
[8] Havrilesky, Th. [1977]. 
[9] Eucken, W. [1950], pp.l56, 262; Goudz waard, B. [1970], p.l09. 
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off predictable reactions in a free market economy, but are themselves 
unpredictable. It is impossible to predict whether, and if so by 
how much, a central bank would alter its rediscount rate, but if it 
were to change it by x percent, then one could predict what would 
happen to prices and investment. Thus the responses of the market 
economy can always be traced back to changes in the data such as changes 
in government policy [10]. The economic process is, in fact, thought 
of as analogous to a completely determined physical or ch emical process. 
In his theory of economic policy, Tinbergen [11] inverted the 
categories of policy instruments and policy goals. Using the example 
just given, he asked how monetary policy instruments should be used 
to stabilise prices. Although Tinbergen used this inversion as a 
methodical device, it opened the way, nevertheless, to a recognition 
that there is an interaction or interdependence between monetary policy 
instruments and the economic process. So developments in the market 
place invite reactions from the monetary authorities and vice versa. 
In its own way, a central bank is just as much part of the 'economy' 
as a business enterprise. If this is so, then the choice and use 
of monetary policy instruments cannot be considered as truly exogenous . 
The interrelationships between changes in policy instruments 
and changes in both the monetary sector and the real economy can be 
complex. A certain event in the market place may cause the authorities 
to change immediately the setting of their instruments. In other 
cases, they may act on the basis of changes in intermediate variables, 
as registered by the policy indicator. Conversely, announced, or even 
expected, changes in the central bank's policies may have direct effects 
[10] Eucken, W. [1950]. 
[11] Tinbergen, J. [1952], p.14. 
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on the buying and selling of financial assets. In general, the 
transmission process is complex because it depends on the trans-
action decisions of banks, and lenders and borrowers of funds. 
The outcome of wage negotiations, for example, would certainly 
have an imprint on prices, capital investment and the demand for 
bank loans. In any case it would be difficult to determine to 
what extent the negotiations were affected by a given or expected 
monetary policy and how the actual outcome would modify central 
bank policy. 
The main value of Tinbergen•s classification of policy variables 
is that it allows for a distinction to be drawn between financial 
markets according to the degree of control exercised by the central 
bank. One can accept the concept of intermediate variables without 
necessarily having to agree with the idea of a predictable relation-
ship between intermediate and ultimate variables. In the following, 
the theory of economic policy will be used as a heuristic device 
to identify the main elements of the Bundesbank•s concept of monetary 
policy. 
1.6 A classification of monetary systems 
Eucken•s methodology [12], no doubt, has had a large imprint 
on economic thinking in Germany. This appears, for example, 
from the review article 11 Monetary theory 11 in the authoritative German 
encyclopaedia , Handwtlrterbuch der Sozial-und Staatswissenschafte n, 
written by the monetary economist Ehrlicher [13]. Without referring 
to Eucken, Ehrlicher approaches monetary policy in terms of •pure 
[12] Eucken, W. [1950]. 
[13] Ehrlicher, W. [1965], pp.231-259. 
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systems •. He defines such systems as pure forms of techniques 
of money creation. The underlying view is that of Eucken•s 
'pure elements• of economic life which can be arranged like the 
letters of the alphabet into an economic order [14]. It is a 
view on economics which seems to have been inspired by chemistry. 
So concrete monetary systems will be combinations of pure monetary 
systems. Ehrlicher enumerates the following pure systems [15]. 
a. A commodity system of money creation (gold standard) in 
which monetary policy is concerned to maintain the external 
value of money. 
b. A credit money system in which the authorities aim at maintaining 
monetary equilibrium or neutral money. 
c. A system of State intervention designed to achieve particular 
goals such as price stability, full employment and economic 
growth. 
Ehrlicher•s description of a credit system of money relies 
heavily on Wicksell's view that price stability cannot be achieved 
unless the natural rate of interest equals the banks' loan rate [16]. 
Apparently, Wicksell enjoys a certain popularity in Germany. 
In practice, a monetary system can be organised in such a 
way that conflicts arise between its pure elements. For example, 
a system of fixed rates of exchange, when combined with a domestic 
credit system, would create conflicts if the growth of productivity 
was diverging between participating countries. The more productive 
country would develop balance of payments surpluses with inflationary 
effects. 
In Ehrlicher•s view [17], a system of flexible rates of exchange 
[14] Eucken, W. [1950], p.l66 ff. 
[15] Ehrlicher, W. [1965], p.249 ff. 
[16] Wicksell, K. [1898/1936]. 
[17] Ibid., p.252. 
- 12 -
would overcome this type of conflict. Later on it will be shown 
that the Bundesbank shares this opinion. Internal stability would 
also be jeopardised if the State were to create substantial amounts 
of money to finance its expenditures. Sooner or later it would 
be necessary to remove money from circulation, say by means of 
higher taxes, stabilisation loans (as applied in Germany in 1973) 
or a currency reform. 
The exampl5given point to the fact that views such as held 
by Eucken and Ehrlicher have had an impact on monetary thinking 
in Germany and probably also on the views of the Bundesbank. 
1.7 The functions of money 
Eucken•s methodology is rejected by the Dutch monetary theorist 
Bos [18]. Instead of approaching economic life in terms of 
non-existent •pure forms•, like Eucken did, monetary economics 
should be empirical and examine how money actually functions in 
a concrete economy. 
Since there is no doubting that money fulfils a number of 
functions, it is important to know how a central bank perceives 
these functions and how it brings this perception to bear upon 
its monetary policies. In addition, an empirical examination 
of the functioning of money during a particular period may serve 
as an audit on a central bank•s performance. 
Bos distinguishes three basic, micro-economic, functions [19]. 
a. Money as a means of payment. 
b. Money as a means of preparing for future payments (liquidity 
or store of value function). 
[18] Bos, P. C. [1969]. 
[19] Ibid., pp.56-67. 
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c. Money as a means of determining amounts to be paid (prices 
defined from a monetary angle). 
The significance of function c (pricing function) is that 
prices are set by economic decisionmakers as amounts to be paid 
for the purchase of goods and services. Recent history has certainly 
shown that the pricing of energy products and labour services can 
have major monetary consequences. 
The Bundesbank•s concern that employers and unions should 
not bargain for wage increases which would jeopardise price stability 
underlines its awareness of the importance of money•s pricing function [20]. 
In general, money is an essential economic tool, which may be 
used either economically or uneconomically. If it is used properly 
it will render a maximum of benefits. I f i t i s used uneconomically, 
it will fail to render the services it is capable of, so that it mal-
functions. 
Monetary management should strive to secure the best possible 
use of money. 
Since money is an asset which is capable of performing simultaneously 
a number of distinct, though related, functions, its improper use in 
one of its functions will have repercussions on the other functions. 
For example, should money be used excessively as a means of payment, 
then spending would cause prices to rise and economic subjects would 
have an incentive to look for substitute stores of value. 
An inquiry into the functioning of money should study a wide 
variety of indicators, related to each function in turn. This approach 
suggests that what matters eventually is not so much whether the subjective 
goals of policymakers are attained, but rather whether money has been 
[20] E.g. Bundesbank, AR 1974, pp.l2-14. 
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functioning as well as it should from an economic point of view. 
The functions of money are much more of a •universal • than the subjective 
views of policymakers·. 
1.8 Closed or open-ended systems? 
So far three approaches to a central bank•s concept have been 
suggested. First, an examination of its preferred policy instruments, 
intermediate variables and policy indicator. Second, its view on 
monetary systems. For instance, does a central bank favour a system 
of flexible or one of fixed rates of exchange? Third, the central 
bank•s perception of money•s functions. 
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. Each may contribute 
insights which cannot be so easily derived from the others. 
In this connection, it is of some interest to note Ehrlicher•s 
observation [21] t hat since the time of the Great Depression theoretical 
interest has shifted from the construction of business cycle theories 
as closed systems, moved along by one particular cause to a much more 
open-ended approach, which tries to classify all factors which bear 
upon the economy. Thus, the following diagram, as produced by Ehrlicher 
[22], could indicate all the possible factors influencing the value 
of money. 
Figure 1.2 
Factors of the Value of Money 
L 
M 
Tind 
Tr 
Monetary supply price ~ Value of Money + Monetary demand 
t 
[21] Ibid., p.246. 
[22] Ibid., p.241. 
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where: L =wage level; M =degree of monopoly; Tind =indirect taxes; 
Tr = terms of trade; K = capacity effect of investment; Te = techno-
logical progress; C = demand for consumption goods; I = demand for 
capital goods; St .= state expenditures; A = external trade balance. 
The output factor is, of course, associated with employment 
as well. 
If policymakers are indeed averse to basing their actions on 
one particular theory and, instead, work on the basis of a classification 
such as depicted in Figure 1.2, then it would be possible to find 
traces of various theories in a central bank•s publications. Nevertheless, 
there is likely to be one dominating theme, one that accords best with 
the outlook of the policymakers, the institutional environment in 
which they are operating, and the prevailing economic situation. 
1.9 Comparison with quantitative reaction functions 
Once the qualitative reaction function of a central bank is derived, 
it could, in principle, be used as a basis for a quantitative estimation 
or modelling. 
Quantitative reaction functions, however, tend to take a different 
form. Potts and Luckett [23] have generalised them as follows: 
MP = f ( U, P, G, B) 
where MP is some indicator of monetary policy, and the symbols 
on the right-hand side of the equation are proxies for unemployment, 
prices, growth, and the balance of payments, respectively. 
Reuber [24], for example, fit~d the following reaction function 
for the Canadian monetary authorities, covering the period 1949-1961: 
-1 -2 
= .51 - .09Ut + .25 lnet + .09 lnPt + 1.35 lnMt-l - .58 lnMt_2.R 
= .9986 
[23] Potts, G. T. and Luckett, D. G. [1978], p.526. 
[24] Reuber, G. L. [1964], pp.l09-132. 
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where .: t = quarters; ln = natural logarithm; M = money supply; 
U- 1 = reciprocal of the percentage of the labour force unemployed; 
e = productivity index; P = consumer price index; R2 = coefficient 
of determination corrected for degrees of freedom. 
Reuber's procedure was, therefore, to relate changes in the 
money supply to changes in indicators of ultimate policy goals, apparently 
assuming that the Canadian monetary authorities had full control over 
changes in the money supply. In order to arrive at conclusions about 
the implied trade-offs of the authorities, Reuber derived an equilibrium 
condition by allowing all lags to work themselves out. 
ln M = 2.20- .37U- 1 + 1.08 lne + .41 lnP. 
This produced: 
Reuber then noted that the equilibrium condition revealed, for example: 
the degree of neutrality and accommodation in monetary policy 
with respect to price changes. Neutrality would imply a 
regression coefficient of zero; complete accommodation would 
imply a coefficient of one. [25] 
In actual fact, the coefficient was 0.41, indicating that the monetary 
authorities neither supplied to the full extent the money required 
to accommodate given price increases nor refused to make any money 
available to finance such price increases. 
This result would have been more interesting if it had been 
contrasted with an assessment of the authorities' view on the money 
supply, the interrelationship between inflation and unemployment and 
so on. In fact, these views should be ascertained before a reaction 
function is fitted. The reasons advanced for a quantitative approach 
as sketched are that a central bank's policy statements may be deceptive 
because policymakers might not carry out their declared policy intentions. 
Alternatively, they might indulge in an ex-post rationalisation of 
failures. 
[25] Ibid., p.l23. 
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While there is certainly a core of truth in these reasons, they, 
nevertheless, do not detract from the fact that a central bank must 
have a view on its role with regard to both the financial sector and 
the real economy. The Bundesbank has definitely such a view. 
1.10 Basler's classification of quantitative reaction functions 
In his doctoral thesis, Basler, a German economist [26], has 
introduced the following classification of quantitative reaction functions. 
Type A (to which Reuber's function belongs) assumes that the 
desired values of the target variables are constant in time and that 
the instrument variables are re-set on the basis of observed values 
of target variables. The influence of past values of the target variables 
is thought to decline geometrically. No attempt is made to set up 
a behavioural model of the decisionmaking process. 
Type B or revealed preference approach. In these models all 
instrument and target variables are considered, so that the authorities• 
preference for particular targets and instruments can be derived. 
Basler criticises both the A and B types. In his view, the 
geometric decline in importance of past target values is unrealistic. 
As statistical information on the values of target variables during 
the current period either is not yet available or only in a very provisional 
form, policymakers might not attach as much importance to it as to 
the more reliable statistics of past periods. 
Secondly, in the course of time the reaction of policymakers to 
similar deviations from certain targets may diverge, because of changing 
insights into the structure of the economy due to new theories, to 
changes in that structure, which have become known, and to changes 
in personnel, or because negative deviations are appreciated differently 
[26] Basler, H. P. [1979]. 
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from positive deviations. These factors are responsible for unstable 
reaction coefficients in type A and B functions. 
Type C makes no a priori assumption about the lag-structure. 
A geometrically declining one is just one of the possibilities. 
Type D functions have an asymmetric loss function. Negative 
deviations from target values are given more weight than positive 
deviations. 
Type E reaction functions have a side condition which allows 
for changes in the ideas of policymakers about the economic structure. 
Type F combines types C, D and E. It assumes that the values 
of the target variables in the current period have no impact on actual 
policy decisions. The lag rules out simultaneous equation bias. 
Basler•s reaction functions E and F combine qualitative as well 
as quantitative factors. This is certainly a positive feature. 
Numbers as such may be of interest to mathematicians, but in economic 
life they are only meaningful in relation to defined concepts and 
variables. The interpretation of quantifications depends, therefore, 
on qualitative concepts. So monetary authorities will not act 
exclusively on the basis of numbers. In spite of this recognition, 
Basler•s preferred F function is still circumscribed by the assumption 
that policymakers attempt to minimise a loss function with implied 
trade-offs, whereas they might not believe in trade-offs. 
1. 11 Summary 
This study produces evidence that the Bundesbank has a distinctive 
view on its function as the epicentre of the German financial system 
as well as on the transmission of its monetary policy to the real 
economy. 
This view should be ascertained as a first step in the identification 
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of a central bank's reaction function. A quantitative assessment 
of this reaction function needs to be considered in a qualitative 
setting. Chapter three, for instance, explains that the Bundesbank 
believes that price stability is an essential precondition for the 
attainment of full employment and economic growth. The Bank attempts 
to achieve price stability by a control of the demand for credit 
and assumes that there is a relationship between the demand for bank 
loans and the growth of the central bank money stock. 
Since a central bank's views are also shaped by institutional 
factors, chapter two explores the institutional framework in which 
the Bundesbank operates. This is followed by an outline of the 
Bank's concept in chapter three. The Bank's monetary policy in 
the period 1972-1979 is assessed in chapter four. The findings of 
chapters two, three and four are drawn together in chapter five to 
suggest a conjectured representation of the Bundesbank's reaction 
function. 
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CHAPTER TWO THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 The government 
The recession of 1967 made the Federal Government aware of its 
inability to steer the economy in a truly anticyclical manner. 
The Act for the Promotion of Stability and Economic Growth 1967 was 
the result. As objectives for economic policy it laid down the 
simultaneous attainment of price stability, a high level of employment, 
external equilibrium and steady economic growth within the context 
of a free market economy. Practically all government institutions 
not only at federal, but also at state and local government level 
are bound to strive for these objectives. 
To achieve these goals a wide range of policy instruments was 
provided, covering economic information, fiscal planning and co-ordination, 
anticyclical regulation of taxation and depreciation allowances, the 
formation of anticyclical reserve funds and prescriptions regarding 
government debt. 
The importance of fiscal co-ordination is brought out by the fact 
that the amount of taxes and social security contributions is as high 
as approximately 50 percent of the national product at factor costs. 
Consequently, the government is a very important economic decision-
maker. Its economic statement, released in January of each year, 
is a significant publication in which it sets out its economic and 
fiscal objectives as well as the policies with which it intends to 
pursue them. In addition, the report discusses the most recent annual 
report of the West German Council of Economic Experts (university 
professors) [1]. 
[1] Roberts, C. C. [1979], p.83: 1 The policy advocated by the Council 
of Economic Experts is based on the neoclassical theory of price 
determination and resource allocation, with scant regard for 
the well known and well founded criticisms levelled at the 
basic tenets of that theory since the time of Keynes. • 
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Bi-annually, the Government must produce a report on government 
subsidies. 
In case the Government fears that decisions to be taken by trade 
unions, employers and local bodies might jeopardise the achievement 
of one or more of the Act•s objectives, it should make information 
available to the parties just mentioned, so as to enable them to co-ordinate 
their decisions (•concerted action• ). 
Fiscal planning and co-ordination is the responsibility of an 
Economic Policy Council and a Fiscal Planning Council. The Bundesbank 
is allowed to participate in both councils. The Act has also made 
it possible for the Bundesbank to make specific policy proposals to 
the Federal Government, although it is not allowed to publicise these. 
The Federal Government•s and States• access to central bank credit 
is strictly limited under the Bundesbank Act 1957. The experience 
of two devastating hyperinflations in a period of 50 years makes 
this limitation politically binding on the government. The Federal Republic•s 
commitment to a free market economy is also stated in the Foreign Trade Act. 
Nonetheless, this Act has given wide powers to the Federal Government 
to intervene in the flows of goods, capital and money if it deems this 
necessary for domestic reasons. 
Should restrictions be called for in matters of capital and finance, 
then the Bundesbank is to be consulted on the shape of the measures to 
be taken. 
The Federal Government, for instance, was responsible for the so-called 
1 Bardepot•, a measure which required non-banks to deposit a certain proportion 
of loans raised abroad in non-interest bearing accounts at the Bundesbank. 
The Bank merely advised on the size of the proportion. 
On the whole, in spite of a basic commitment to free markets, economic 
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and fiscal policy tends to be pragmatic [2]. 
2.2 External relations 
The pragmatic approach is clearly revealed in the Government's policy 
on capital flows. The Deutsche Mark's convertibility notwithstanding, 
restrictions on the import of capital have been imposed in order to achieve 
internal monetary stability. 
As the D-Mark was in fact undervalued [3] there were continuously 
expectations of a revaluation of the 0-Mark under the regime of fixed 
rates of exchange, which prevailed until March 1973. Consequently, the 
0-Mark became an attractive investment currency. Monetary policies 
designed to maintain price stability enhanced this attraction. As 
a result, the Bundesbank found itself frequently in a dilemma. If it 
raised interest rates to combat inflation, an inflow of foreign capital 
would raise internal liquidity and thus frustrate its policy. This 
has served as a justification for various administrative measures against 
capital imports. 
The introduction of a system of floating rates of exchange saw the 
lifting of most, but not all, of these restrictions in 1974. Since 
that time foreign financial investment in W. Germany has risen rapidly 
from OM 90 billion at the end of 1974 to OM 185 billion in the middle 
of 1979 [4] or from about 9 percent to 13 percent of nominal GNP. 
Nevertheless, the Bundesbank has, until recently, strenuously resisted 
[2] Stolper, W. F. and Roskamp, K. W. [1979]: 'Germany has pursued a 
flexible, pragmatic policy without unnecessary ideological blinders. • 
[3] Bundesbank, AR 1977, p.41: ' ... the abandonment of the system of 
fixed exchange rates cleared the way for the gradual elimination 
of the undervaluation of the OM, which had previously had the effect 
of an export subsidy. • 
[4] Bundesbank, MR November, 1979, p.26. 
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any tendency for the D-Mark to become a reserve currency. Its financial 
markets are too small for such a role. Rapid shifts in and out of 
0-Marks could cause havoc in Germany's money and capital markets [5]. 
The emergence in 1979, for the first time in many years, of a current 
account deficit might soften the Bundesbank's resolve, however. At 
any rate, in 1979 it was estimated that at the end of 1978 the total 
amount of OM assets held by foreign monetary authorities was OM 50 billion 
or about 11 percent of their foreign exchange reserves. The fear of the 
D-Mark becoming a reserve currency has been responsible for the Bundesbank's 
refusal to authorise sales of Treasury Bills or Discountable Treasury Bonds 
to foreigners. For the same reason, it has made an agreement with the 
banks that the latter will not issue OM bonds with variable interest 
rates or Transferable Certificates of Deposits denominated in 0-Mark. 
This agreement applies also to the banks' foreign subsidiaries. 
2.3 Parallel markets 
The Bundesbank's regulation of foreign capital inflows and its 
control of domestic money markets may be avoided by dealings in the 
rapidly growing parallel markets for financial claims. 
By way of illustration, the case of borrowers' notes may be adduced. 
Borrowers• notes are financial claims, comparable to promissory letters, 
usually issued by major borrowers such as mortgage banks and central 
giro institutions. They have been issued with a term of more than 
four years. Since in Germany bank liabilities with a term in excess 
of four years are not subject to minimum reserve requirements, funds 
raised by such borrowers• notes are relatively cheap for the banks concerned. 
[5] Bundesbank, MR November, 1979, p.32. 
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For the lenders of the funds the notes are attractive because they are 
exempted from the withholding (or coupon) tax of 25 percent. 
The significant point is that the market for long-term borrowers' 
notes is not constrained by the Bundesbank and, therefore, parallel to 
the constrained money markets. 
The Eurocurrency market is another major instance of a parallel 
market. 
Euro-banks, that is banks domiciled outside West Germany (including 
foreign subsidiaries of German banks), by not being subject to German 
minimum reserve requirements, are able to offer more attractive loan 
rates to customers than their German counterparts. 
Especially in times of restrictive monetary policies in Germany, 
this stimulates German business enterprises to borrow in the Euro-currency 
market. 
Inasmuch as foreign investors want to hold OM assets, they may 
prefer the OM liabilities of banks outside Germany to those of German 
banks, because the latter offer rates which tend to be less attractive, 
owing to the minimum reserve requirements on the external liabilities 
of German banks. Moreover, as pointed out above, short-term German 
securities are not available to foreign investors. 
The interest rate differential in favour of Euro-OM loans increases 
if the foreign demand for OM assets (bank liabilities) increases, for 
instance, when the 0-Mark is expected to appreciate. Conversely, the 
Eurobanks will be unable in that situation to extend OM loans to foreigners, 
unless they reduce their interest rates. The resulting reduction in 
Euro-OM interest rates is, of course, an incentive to German borrowers. 
Thus, the Bundesbank observed: [6] 
Owing to the close ties between the Euro-market and the German 
market an influx of foreign funds to Germany is thus in the 
[6] Bundesbank, MR November, 1979, p.30. 
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end quite possible (with corresponding implications for the exchange 
rate of the Deutsche Mark or the foreign exchange holdings of 
the central bank). 
The existence of parallel Euro-DM money and capital markets is, 
therefore, able to frustrate a restrictive domestic monetary policy 
aimed at reducing the scope of bank lending. This explains why former 
Bundesbank president, Dr. 0. Emminger, referred to these markets as a 
parallel government [7]. 
2.4 The banking system 
West German banks offer a wide range of services. Roughly speaking, 
they combine the functions of trading banks, merchant banks and finance 
companies in Anglo-Saxon countries. They are, therefore, better described 
as credit institutions or all-purpose banks. 
Although the credit institutions range in size from very small 
to very large, the industry is dominated by the three large commercial 
banks. Since the currency reform of 1948, competition among banks has 
been fierce, witness, for instance, the rapid growth in the number of 
bank branches. So the savings banks have expanded into commercial 
banking, whereas the commercial banks have ventured successfully into 
the area of the savings banks. There has also been a strong tendency 
for small private bankers to be taken over by larger banks. 
In addition to the all-purpose banks, there are a few specialised 
banks, operating mainly in the market for mortgage finance. Building 
societies may also be mentioned in this respect. It is important to 
note that some credit institutions which extend long-term loans on the 
basis of security issues are considered to be banks by the Bundesbank. 
[7] Emminger, 0. [1977], p.29. 
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As far as solvency is concerned, the credit institutions are subject 
to control by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office and not to the 
Bundesbank. 
The relationship between the credit institutions and non-banks 
deserves special attention. 
It is a peculiar feature of West German banks that they invest 
in shares and are represented on the boards of the companies in which 
they have a significant financial stake. They are, in fact, the only 
dealers in the share market. 
development. 
There is an historic reason for this 
In the eighteenth century, German industrialists, unlike their 
British counterparts, could not fall back upon a large and wealthy middle 
class for the funds they required. Consequently, the banks were called 
upon to finance the infant industries. The advantage of such a close 
relationship between banks and industry is that in times of trouble 
the banks may convert their outstanding loans into equity capital and 
so stave off bankruptcy. 
Another aspect of this state of affairs is that the share market 
is not a major source of company finance. The market value of shares 
listed on the various German stock exchanges is about 12 percent of 
GNP against 40 percent in Great Britain and 44 percent in the USA [8]. 
Industrial reconstruction after the Second World War was certainly 
not financed by the share market, although business enterprises had to 
borrow heavily. 
Even at the present time, German industry is highly geared. For 
example, during the period 1972-1979, the ratio of own funds to total 
funds employed, of companies whose balance sheets are analysed by the 
[8] West Deutsche Landesbank [1980], p.38. 
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Bundesbank, varied between 22 and 32 percent. 
The banks play a major role in financing industry, for example by 
floating security issues on behalf of their customers. Table 2.1 sets 
out the number of banks and their volume of business. 
Table 2.1 
The West German Banking System 
as at end 1979 
Type of bank 
Commercial banks 
Big banks 
Regional banks and other 
commercial banks 
Branches of foreign banks 
Private bankers 
Central giro institutions 
Savings banks 
Central institutions of credit 
co-operatives 
Credit co-operatives 
Mortgage banks 
Instalment sales financing 
institutions 
Banks with special functions 
Postal giro and savings banks 
All banking groups 
No. of banks 
252 
6 
101 
56 
89 
12 
603 
10 
4443 
39 
115 
17 
15 
5506 
No. of 
branches 
5891 
3104 
2463 
47 
277 
317 
16752 
49 
15117 
29 
503 
76 
38734 
Volume of business 1 
As 
% of 
OM billion total 
536.9 24.7 
227.8 10.5 
237.5 10.9 
38.3 1.8 
33.3 1.5 
356.1 16.4 
47.6.8 21.9 
89.4 4.1 
229.0 10.5 
285.3 13. 1 
25.4 1.2 
137.3 6.3 
39.7 1.8 
2176.0 100.0 
1Total of balance sheet plus endorsement liabilities from rediscounted 
bills of exchange and other contingent liabilities. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1980) and Monthly Reports. 
2.5 The Bundesbank 
The liquidity of the banking system is controlled by the Bundesbank, 
whose structure may be described briefly as follows: 
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a) Legislation 
The Bundesbank Act 1957 stipulates that the Bundesbank shall be 
an autonomous federal institution, charged with: 
... to regulate the note and coin circulation and the supply of 
credit to the economy with the aim of safeguarding the currency 
and shall ensure appropriate payments through banks within 
the country as well as to and from foreign countries. (Section 3) 
Former Bundesbank vice-president (1970-1977) and president (1978-1979), 
Dr. 0. Emminger, noted in an interview in 1977: 
The official documents pertaining to section 3 make it clear already 
that the stability of the currency depends on decisions with respect 
to the correct administration of the quantity of money. [9] 
In the Bank•s interpretation of section 3, therefore, the supply 
of credit is to be regulated in such a way that it does not produce 
a volume of money which would jeopardise price stability. It wi 11 
be shown that this is indeed a key idea in the Bundesbank•s concept 
of financial market regulation. 
b) The Bundesbank•s independence 
The Bundesbank is an independent agency. Its relationship with 
the Federal Government is set out in section 12 of the Bundesbank Act 1957, 
as follows: 
The Deutsche Bundesbank shall be obliged insofar as is consistent 
with its functions, to support the general economic policy 
of the Federal Government. In the exercise of the powers 
conferred on it under this Law it shall not be subject 
to instructions from the Federal Government. 
Hence, the Bank is not allowed to compromise on price stability in 
favour of other economic objectives. The Bank•s independence does not 
preclude, however, regular contact with the Federal Government. Thus, 
cabinet ministers may attend meetings of the Central Bank Council. 
[9] R. Hertl [1977]: Dr. Emminger: •In der amtlichen BegrUndung dazu 
hiess es schon, dass die Stabilerhaltung der WMhrung .. wesentlich 
von den ~tscheidungen Uber die richtige Dosierung der Geldmenge 
abhl:lngt 11 • • 
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Although they lack voting power, they ·may propose motions, and 
request that decisions taken by the Council be deferred for two weeks. 
Similarly, the Bundesbank president is entitled to attend cabinet meetings 
which discuss: 
matters of importance in the field of monetary policy. 
(Section 13 of the Bundesbank Act 1957) 
c) The Bundesbank's policymakers 
The Central Bank Council is the Bank's main policymaking body, 
consisting of the President, the Vice-President, the other members of 
the Directorate and the Presidents of the Land Central Banks (State 
branches of the Bundesbank). Each member is entitled to one vote and 
decisions are taken by majority vote. The Directorate is responsible 
for the implementation of the Central Bank Council's decisions. It 
consists of the President and the Vice-President of the Bundesbank and 
of not more than eight other members. All members of the Directorate 
must have special professional qualifications and are appointed by the 
, President of the Federal Republic, on the advice of the Federal Government, 
which must consult the Central Bank Council. The members of the Directorate 
hold office for eight years. The Presidents of the Land Central Banks 
are appointed by the President of the Federal Republic, on the advice 
of the Bundesrat [10]. 
d) The Bundesbank's publications 
Although the Bank is only required to publish its accounting statements 
and may publish statistics collected, it does, in fact, make a wide range 
of material available. Its views and comments are made known in its 
[10] The Bundesrat is a type of upper house. It consists of the presidents 
of the LMnder (the States) and must be consulted by the government 
of the Federal Republic on matters pertaining to the LMnder. 
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Annual Report (AR) and in its Monthly Report (MR), which has also a 
substantial statistical section. In addition, the Bank issues five 
specialised statistical series, extracts from press articles (containing 
speeches of officials etc.) and occasional papers. The German monetary 
economist R. Pohl has made the point that the Bank's publications are 
essentially exercises in persuasion. In his view, the strategy is to 
allow an extensive use of apparently objective theoretical terminology 
to give the impression that policies are based upon precise, objective 
analysis. In reality, this would be a ploy to conceal the policymakers' 
ideology. The public likes to think of the Bundesbank as the only 
reliable and objective economic institution, doggedly devoted to nothing 
but the public interest [11]. Without denying the persuasive character 
of the publications, it would go too far, as pointed out in chapter one, 
to assume that they are merely deceptive. There must be a view on the 
role money and credit play as well. 
2.6 The Bundesbank's powers 
The Bundesbank Act 1957 has equipped the central bank with consider-
able powers. They may be set out under the following headings : 
a) Minimum reserve requirements 
Credit institutions may be required to deposit, on giro account, 
non-interest bearing minimum reserve holdings equal to a specified 
percentage of their liabilities arising from s ight, time and savings 
deposits, insofar as they have a term of less than four years. The 
minimum reserve ratios may not exceed 30 percent for s ight liabilities, 
[11] Pohl, R. [1971], pp.9-ll. 
- 31 -
20 percent for time deposits and 10 percent for savings deposits. 
For external liabilities, however, they may be as high as 100 percent. 
The credit institutions must comply with these minimum reserve 
requirements on a monthly basis, in the sense that their monthly average 
reserve holdings should equal the required amount . This allows them 
to hold, for example, lower reserves than required during the first 
half of the month, as long as they make up for it during the second 
half. The credit institutions may calculate the daily average over 
the period from the 16th day of the previous month to the 15th day of 
the current month, or, alternatively, as the average of their reserve 
holdings on the 23rd day and the last day of the previous month and 
their holdings on the 7th and 15th day of the current month. Since 
March 1977 the minimum reserve ratios have been differentiated by size 
of deposits, the categories being: up to 10 million OM; 10-100 million OM; 
more than 100 million OM. The higher the volume, the higher the reserve 
ratio is. 
The Bundesbank has the power to impose a minimum reserve ratio on 
the growth of external liabilities, in addition to the ra tio on external 
liabilities as such, provided the combined minimum reserve obligation 
on them does not exceed the legal maximum of 100 percent. Should the 
banks fail to comply with their minimum reserve requirements, they are 
charged a penalty equal to the prevailing Lombard rate plus 3 percentage 
points per annum, for every period of 30 days. 
b) Rediscount rates and quotas 
The Bank is empowered to set interest rates and rediscount rates, 
and to determine the principles governing its credit and open market 
operations. Traditionally, the Bundesbank has set rediscount quotas 
for individual credit institutions. Currently, these quotas are related 
to the amount of capital and reserves of the bank. Capital and reserves 
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in excess of OM 200 million are subject to a regressive scale. The 
higher they are, the lower the percentage increase in the rediscount 
quota. Furthermore, after application of the regressive scale, the 
amount of capital and reserves, on which the rediscount quota is based, 
is further reduced on the basis of the structural component, which 
is equal to the amount of short- and medium-term loans to non-banks 
expressed as a percentage of the bank's business volume. Occasionally, 
the Bundesbank has reduced temporarily the extent to which the rediscount 
quotas could be used from 100 percent to x percent (x < 100). 
Similarly, the quotas have been reduced at certain times by the 
amount by which the external liabilities of the banks exceeded an initial 
base figure. For example, between 1 October 1973 and 1 January 1974 
the credit institutions had to maintain reserve holdings on time deposits 
of foreigners equal to 60 percent of the growth of time liabilities over 
63.75 percent of the average level of the return dates October 23 and 31, 
and November 7 and 15, 1971. 
The banks may avail themselves of the rediscount facility by selling 
good commercial bills to the Privatdiskont A.G. The bills must be 
backed by three parties which are known to be solvent. In practice, 
the Privatdiskont A.G. will be one of these three parties, because 
the Bundesbank is only prepared to rediscount bills if they have been 
endorsed by this discount house (the only one in Germany). 
Banks tend to rediscount eligible bills in order to comply with 
their minimum reserve requirements. 
c) Lombard rates and credits 
If a bank has exhausted its rediscount quota, it may apply for 
a special short-term credit known as Lombard credit. Usually, the 
Lombard rate is 1 percentage point higher than the rediscount rate, 
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although on occasions the margin may be greater or smaller. 
In practice, the availability of Lombard credit has been 
limited, and sometimes it has been suspended altogether. So 
as to avoid extremely tight situations on the money market, special 
type Lombard credits have been granted at special rates of interest. 
From time to time, Lombard credit has been made subject to quantitative 
limits (for example, as a monthly average not more than 15 percent 
of the bank's rediscount quota). 
If a bank is able to apply for a Lombard loan, it must supply 
a collateral as prescribed by the Bundesbank Act 1957. For example, 
a bill of exchange eligible for rediscounting would qualify for 
up to 90 percent of its nominal value and a Discountable Treasury Bond 
for up to 75 percent of its nominal value, provided it matures 
within a year from the day the Lombard loan is granted. 
d) Open-market policy 
aa) Money market 
In order to regulate the money market, the Bundesbank 
may buy or sell Treasury Bills or discountable Treasury Bonds. 
The latter fall into two categories, those which are included in 
the Bank's money market regulating arrangements and, therefore, 
can be sold to the Bundesbank at any time and those which are not 
(known as ~-paper). The Bank may buy N-paper when it sees fit 
to do so. 
With a view to keeping the banks' supply of potential central 
bank money as small as possible, the Bank has mainly been issuing 
N-paper in recent years. The amount of money the public authorities 
can raise through issuing Treasury Bills and ~scountable Treasury Bonds 
is subject to a legal maximum. If the Bundesbank's supply of such 
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paper is insufficient, then it may mobilise its claim of OM 8 billion 
on the Federal Government, obtained as part of the currency reform 
of 1948, by requesting that the whole or part of this claim be 
converted into Treasury Bills and Bonds (mobilisation paper). 
The Act for the Promotion of Stability and Economic Growth 1967 
has extended this claim by another amount of OM 8 billion (described 
as liquidity paper) to a total of OM 16 billion. 
Mobilisation and liquidity paper do not have to be sold 
exclusively to the banks. Their revenue may only be used for their 
redemption. The proceeds from their sale must be deposited in 
a special account at the Bundesbank. The Bundesbank may direct 
the public authorities as to whether they should deposit their cash 
at the Bundesbank or in accounts at the credit institutions. 
A shift from an account at the central bank to the credit institutions 
would have the effect of increasing the liquidity of the credit 
institutions. 
The money market can also be fine-tuned by foreign exchange 
transactions. In 1979, for example, the Bundesbank made swap 
arrangements with the banks. The central bank bought USA dollars 
from the banks spot and sold them back three months forward. 
In this way the banks were able to maintain their reserve holdings 
at the Bundesbank at a time when they had to finance an outflow 
of foreign exchange. 
bb) Capital market 
From time to time the Bank intervenes in the capital 
market to influence interest rates by either buying or selling 
long-term fixed interest rate securities, issued by the public 
authorities, such as Federal Financing Bonds. 
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2.7 The Bundesbank•s definitions of monetary aggregates 
Open-market policies in Germany are not so much used to control 
the money stock supply directly, but rather to regulate the liquidity 
of the banking system and interest rates on the various financial 
markets. Whereas in the USA the public debt is large enough to 
allow a regulation of the money supply by means of open-market 
operations, the German public debt is too small for this purpose. 
OECD figures for 1978 show that the USA public debt came to 89 percent 
of the nominal GNP at the end of 1978. For West Germany the 
comparable figure was 29 percent. Large-scale sales or purchases 
of debt instruments in Germany would cause, therefore, major changes 
in interest rates. This is one of the reasons why the portfolio 
balance theory has never had much appeal in Germany [12]. 
Whether the money stock will remain in bounds acceptable 
to the Bundesbank depends, by and large, on the public•s willingness 
to invest money long-term at the credit institutions. This is 
the institutional significance of the monetary aggregate known as 
monetary capital formation. 
Monetary Capital Formation is defined as the total funds 
at the banks for a period of four years or more. This includes 
savings deposits at agreed notice of withdrawal, bank savings bonds 
as well as the credit institutions• capital and reserves. The 
Bundesbank•s definitions of other monetary aggregates are currently: 
M3 The total of currency in the hands of the public; demand 
deposits; term deposits with a term of less than four 
years; savings deposits at statutory notice of withdrawal 
(e.g. 3 months). Savings deposits with an agreed 
notice of withdrawal (usually six months or more) 
are considered as part of monetary capital formation. 
[12] f'eubauer, W. [1977]. 
- 36 -
M2 The total of currency in the hands of the public; demand 
deposits; term deposits with a term of less than four 
years. 
Ml The total of currency in the hands of the public and demand 
deposits. 
It should be noted that monetary capital formation, M3 , M2 
and Ml include only domestic liabilities. 
Central Bank Money Stock (CBMS) is the sum of the following 
central bank liabilities: currency in the hands of the public 
and the minimum reserves on domestic liabilities held by the 
credit institutions at the Bundesbank. As will be shown later, 
this aggregate does not function as a monetary base in Germany. 
Free Liquid Reserves is the sum of the following central 
bank liabilities: balances of the credit institutions in excess 
of their minimum reserve requirements; mobilisation and liquidity 
paper outstanding. 
To this total the following are added: unutilised rediscount 
quotas (a figure which is not published) and the credit institutions' 
holdings of money market paper, which the Bundesbank is obliged 
to buy back from them when so requested. 
Free Liquid Reserves can be transformed into central bank 
money at very short notice. They may properly be described as 
potential central bank money or as the credit institutions' secondary 
liquidity. 
2.8 The money market 
The Bundesbank orchestrates its policy instruments to regulate 
the supply of and demand for central bank money. 
The credit institutions sell their surpluses and borrow 
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to finance their deficits of central bank money in the money market. 
Surpluses of central bank money can be lent for periods of 24 hours; 
le~tfor indefinite periods but at one day's notice; or but for 
definite periods (one month, three months, six months, one year 
being the most usual ones). The trade in central bank balances 
compares with the weekly bidding by banks for treasury bills in 
Great Britain and the USA. Excess reserves which cannot be 
sold to other banks are invested in money market paper. Deficits 
which cannot be covered in the interbank segment of the market 
must be financed through the Bundesbank (see sections 2.6b and 2.6c 
above on rediscount quota and Lombard loans respectively). 
It is the Bundesbank which declares which financial instruments 
will be traded as money market paper. If the Bank is prepared 
to buy certain financial instruments before they mature, respectively 
to discount them, when offered by the credit institutions, and without 
charging these purchases to their rediscount quota, then these 
instruments will function as money market paper. Currently, the 
following paper is included in the Bundesbank's money market regulating 
arrangements: 
a. Treasury Bills of Federal Government and Federal Railways 
running for 30-59 days and 60-90 days. 
b. Discountable Treasury Bonds of Federal Government, Federal Railways 
and Federal Post Office running for six months, 12 months, 18 months 
and 24 months. 
The Bundesbank announces the rates at which it is prepared 
to sell money market paper, but it does not divulge the rates at 
which it would buy back. They tend to be higher than the selling 
rates. 
In order to dampen violent fluctuations in short-term rates 
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for day-to-day money, the Bundesbank has, occasionally, enabled the 
credit institutions to obtain finance through repurchase agreements. 
The credit institutions, for instance, may obtain Bundesbank loans at 
pre-determined rates of interest for periods of 10 days against the 
collateral of domestic bills of exchange eligible for rediscount at the 
Bundesbank. Traditionally, bills of exchange have been very popular 
in Germany. Credit institutions may obtain cash by selling prime ban~ers• 
acceptances to the Privatdiskont A.G. The Bundesbank is prepared to 
rediscount these bills up to the limit of the rediscount quotas fixed 
for each bank. From time to time, the Bundesbank has been prepared 
to buy bank acceptances to a certain limit, outside of the banks• rediscount 
quotas. 
2.9 The capital market 
The credit institutions are the major parties both on the supply 
and on the demand side of the capital market. This implies that there 
is a very close relationship between the money market and the capital 
market. If the banks have a surplus of funds, they will invest in capital 
market paper. Conversely, when the demand for bank loans increases and 
the money market comes under pressure, the credit institutions are likely 
to sell bonds and hence to withdraw funds from the market. To put it 
another way, the capital market is not so much supplied by a flow of 
long-term funds, but rather by a flow of money. According to KBhler [13], 
this is not sufficiently realised. Policymakers are inclined to think 
of the capital market as a basin which collects the supply of long-term 
funds. Should demand threaten to outstrip supply, then administrative 
measures should be taken to pare it down to the level of supply. In 
[13] KBhler, C. [1977], p.l43. 
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effect, committees have been set up to determine the demand for long-
term funds administratively so as to mesh with the available supply 
of long-term funds. For private sector issues this is the Central 
Capital Market Committee which consists of representatives of the Bundesbank 
and of the major credit institutions. This composition makes it possible 
to match the interests of those who want to float debenture issues with 
the central bank's monetary policies. In 1975, for instance, this 
Committee halted temporarily the placing of foreign issues in order to 
support the Bundesbank's policy of lowering interest rates on the capital 
market [14]. The co-ordinating body for the public sector is the 
Economic Policy Council, on which the Bundesbank is also represented. 
Itprepares proposals regarding the size, conditions and timing of new 
government loans. Ktlhler comments that the basin theory of the capital 
market appears to play an important role in the recommendations of this 
Counci 1 [15]. Government approval is required for private sector issues 
so as to rule out issues of non-creditworthy borrowers. 
Table 2.2 sets out the volume of outstanding fixed interest rate 
securities of domestic issu ers . 
Table 2.2 
Outstanding Domestic Issues of Fixed Interest Rate Securities as at 
the end of December 1979 
Mortgage bonds 
Communal bonds 
Bonds of specialised banks 
Other bank bonds 
Industrial bonds 
Public bonds 
Total 
Nominal 
97.9 
179.4 
25.4 
69.3 
5.8 
125.8 
503.6 
OM bi 11 ion 
As % of total 
19.4 
35.6 
5.0 
13.8 
1.2 
25.0 
100.0 
[14] International Currency Review, July-August 1975, article: 11 Widening 
Differentials between US and Continental Rates .. , p.32. 
[15] Ktlhler, C. [1977], p. 144. 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports 
Table 2.3 shows the development of the securities market during 
the review period. 
Table 2.3 
Term Structure of Fixed Interest Rate Securities Outstanding.Issues 
Falling Due en bloc (Issues not falling due en bloc are excluded) 
A. OM billion 
4 years 
Term & less 4-9 years 10 and more years Total 
As at: 
30.9.71 23.0 27.6 1.5 52.0 
30.9.72 32.1 40.2 4.0 76.3 
30.9.73 39.3 58.4 2.8 100.6 
30.9.74 51.8 72.0 2.6 126.4 
30.9.75 78.0 100.2 1.4 179.6 
30.9.76 118.0 115.0 1.7 235.7 
30.9.77 157.2 125.1 5.6 288.0 
30.9.78 195.7 151.0 8.0 357.7 
31.12.79 238.4 166.7 8.1 413.2 
B. As percentages of total 
30.9.71 44 53 3 100 
30.9.72 42 53 5 100 
30.9.73 39 58 3 100 
30.9.74 41 57 2 100 
30.9.75 43 56 1 100 
30.9.76 50 49 1 100 
30.9.77 55 43 2 100 
30.9.78 55 43 2 100 
31.12.79 58 40 2 100 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthl~ Reports 
Table 2.3A indicates that the securities market has grown significantly 
since 1971. The message of table 2.3B seems to be that increasing 
uncertainty and a trend of rising interest rates have resulted in shorter 
terms to maturity. 
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2.10 Financial wealth 
A rapid growth in the holdings of financial assets of domestic 
non-financial sectors is also shown by table 2.4. Since the end of 
1971 financial wealth rose by an amount of OM 1,162.6 billion. As 
the total held at the end of 1978 was OM 1,991.7 billion, it can be 
inferred that the total amount grew from OM 999.4 billion at the end of 
1971 to OM 2,162.0 billion at the end of 1979, that is at a compound 
rate of 10.1 percent per annum. This compares with a compound growth 
rate of nominal GNP of 7.96 percent during this period. This is certainly 
a very high rate of financial growth. Chapter four will pursue the 
reasons for this in more detail. 
Table 2.4 
Annual Changes in the Financial Wealth of Domestic Non-Financial Sectors 
Type of Asset 
1 Currency & demand 
deposits 
2 Time deposits 2 
3 Saving deposits 
4 Deposits at building 
OM billion 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1 
20.1 7.5 18.2 22.9 3.6 20.2 36.8 8.2 
24.8 43.9 6.3 - 8.4 28.6 35.4 32.2 49.5 
32.8 15.1 31.2 67.3 36.1 28.3 30.5 12.7 
societies 7.1 8.8 5.8 7.3 6.9 6.5 7.3 7.9 
5 Claims on insurance 13.8 15.4 16.5 16.3 17.7 19.7 22.7 24.8 
6 Money market paper - 0.4 5.1 - 0.4- 2.9 0.1 - 1.1 0.4 0.6 
7 Securities including 
shares 12. 8 16. 4 14. 7 15. 9 27. 2 17. 2 1 7. 9 40. 5 
8 Other claims 13.2 16.3 37.3 20.1 31.0 25.8 20.5 26.2 
Total 124.2128.5 129.6 138.5151.2 152.0 168.3 170.3 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, MR May 1975, MR May 1980, and Bundesbank (1980) 
1 Provisional 
2 Including bank savings bonds, bearer savings bonds and funds channelled 
through banks and including government participations in public-law 
banks. 
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2.11 Summary 
The experience of two devastating hyperinflations within a period 
of 50 years has made it imperative for the German government to strive 
for price stability. This explains why the Bundesbank has been set 
up as an independent institution entrusted with the conduct of monetary 
policy and equipped for this purpose with formidable powers to control 
the liquidity of the financial system, its most important policy instruments 
being minimum reserve ratios, rediscount rates, rediscount quotas and 
controls on Lombard credits. For the same reason, the amount of central 
bank finance which the government is able to raise is strictly limited. 
The Bundesbank uses open-market policies to fine-tune the money mar.ket 
rather than to control the money stock supply. The small size of both 
the public debt and financial markets rules out large scale open-market 
operations. The amount of long-term funds borrowed by the banks functions 
as a surrogate for such open-market policies. Banks in West Germany 
carry out a large range of functions and play key roles in the financing 
of industry, not only in the short-run, but also in the long-run. 
Basically, they control the supply of funds to the capital market. 
The demand for long-term funds, however, is administratively determined 
so as to mesh with the available supply. 
In reaction to the totalitarian regime which had plunged Germany 
into the Second World War, German policymakers have committed themselves 
to the concept of a free market economy. The State should confine 
itself to setting the conditions under which markets work best. This 
has led to pragmatic economic and fiscal policies. The Foreign Trade Act, 
for example, allows major interventions in the free flow of goods, 
money and capital for the sake of domestic economic stability. 
Controls on the inflow of foreign capital as well as stringent 
monetary policies have given rise to the development of unconstrained 
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markets in financial claims parallel to the constrained ones. The 
Eurocurrency markets are a case in point. 
Despite policies aimed at maintaining price stability, the amount 
of financial assets held by non-banks increased at a compound rate 
of 10.1 percent compared with a compound growth rate of GNP of 8.0 percent 
in the period 1972-1979. 
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CHAPTER THREE THE BUNDESBANK 1 S CONCEPTS 
3.1 Chief elements of the Bundesbank•s overall concept 
Control of the credit system is essential in the Bundesbank•s 
view, if the ultimate goal of price stability is to be achieved. 
In turn, price stability is the key to the attainment of full employment, 
economic growth and equilibrium in the balance of payments. A strict 
control of the supply of central bank money is seen as vital for the 
regulation of the credit system: if the Bundesbank wishes to restrict 
bank lending, it will raise the marginal costs of any additional central 
bank money required by the credit institutions. Its main policy instru-
ments for this purpose are minimum reserve ratios, controls on Lombard 
credit, rediscount quotas and money market interest rates. This approach 
is consistent with the liquidity theory of money. 
The Bundesbank analyses the behaviour of the financial system 
by means of the consolidated balance sheet of the central bank and 
the credit institutions. It emphasises those variables which require 
attention in the light of the prevailing economic situation. Consequently, 
within the framework of economic policy as adapted by Brunner and Meltzer [1], 
the Bundesbank•s preferred intermediate variable appears to be changing 
from one period to another. The concept of a credit system approach 
is more general in that it allows for more than one intermediate variable, 
the central bank•s choice depending on the economic situation. 
In the credit system, as it is conceived by the Bundesbank, the 
volume of bank credit is of strategic importance. The volume of 
money is also important, but it is basically a residual variable dependent 
upon bank lending, public sector finance, long-term bank liabilities 
[1] Brunner, K. and Meltzer, A. [1969]. 
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(monetary capital formation) and inflows of foreign exchange. 
An assessment of the inflationary significance of the volume 
of bank lending is usually made in conjunction with the development 
of long-term bank liabilities (monetary capital formation). 
The Bundesbank's view of the financial sector's transmission 
process hinges on a Wicksellian interplay between the banks' loan rate 
of interest and the natural rate of interest as well as on the volume 
of short-term financial assets and means of payment. In this context, 
flexible rates of exchange insulate the credit system from external 
inflows of capital, whereas the harmful effects of fiscal policies and 
wage bargaining are avoided by the monetary target approach: the increases 
in spending these induce crowd out other forms of expenditure. 
3.2 The control of central bank money supply 
As a central bank, the Bundesbank believes that it should not 
operate as a wholesale price fix dealer in money, who supplies whatever 
is demanded. Instead, central bank money should always be in tight 
supply, with the varying degree of scarcity expressing the central 
bank's intentions [2]. In essence, it wishes to shape its policies 
in such a way that the interest rate level and the state of the money 
market reflect the scarcity of central bank money. 
Since the transition to a system of flexible rates of exchange 
in March 1973, which allowed the Bundesbank, at least in principle, 
to regain full control of the domestic monetary system, the Bank has 
tried to implement restrictive monetary policies by making additional 
central bank money available at rising marginal costs. The require-
ment for such policies is that the amount of free liquid reserves at 
[2] Bundesbank [1980], p.36: dass zwischen Zentralbankgeldbedarf 
der Banken und Zentralbankgeldangebot der Notenbank ein Spannungsverh~ltnis 
besteht, das den Intentionen der Notenbank entspricht.' 
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the disposal of the credit institutions is always at a technical minimum [3]. 
Figure 3.1 pictures the Bank•s view of the ideal supply curve of 
the credit institutions• central bank finance. 
Figure3.1 
The Central Bank Money Supply Schedule 
Cost of 
central bank 
money 
Central bank money 
Imprint of central bank 
restrictions 
[3] Bundesbank, MR July 1974: 11 Centra 1 Bank Money Stock and 
Banks• Free Liquid Reserves", pp.l4-20: 
The "transmission mechanism .. , on which this policy of central 
bank money control is based, is of course not a rigid mechanical 
process, but results from the interplay of price (i.e. interest 
rate) and quantity reactions. If under this system banks 
go beyond the rate of expansion desired by the central 
bank in their lending, they will soon notice a great 
increase in the cost of obtaining funds on the money 
market and will restrict their credit expansion, because 
they would no longer be able to gain additional profit 
thereby, but possibly suffer losses. Thus the banks• 
individual targets, as well as customers• decisions, are 
influenced by changes in interest rates and interest rate 
relations. [p.l9] 
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In the Bank's econometric model [4], the Lombard rate functions 
as a proxy for the marginal rate of interest for central bank credit. 
It goes without saying that the marginal cost of central bank 
money is affected not only by changes in interest rates, but also 
by changes in minimum reserve ratios, rediscount quotas, availability 
of Lombard loans etc. The costs are reflected in the credit 
institutions' supply schedule. 
This point may be illustrated on the basis of the model of 
Richer, McMahon and Regier [5]. Assuming that banks expand their 
lending up to the point where marginal costs equal marginal revenue, 
the marginal cost of bank lending can be derived from the following 
formula for bank profits: 
Q = i E + zFR - K[E] 
where: 
Q = bank profit 
E = earning assets 
FR = free liquid reserves (mainly money market paper which 
the Bundesbank is prepared to buy back at any time 
and unused rediscount quotas) 
K = total costs of banking 
= interest rate on earning assets 
z = representative money market interest rate. 
Equilibrium is reached when: 
QQ. = . + dFR _ dK = O . dFR dK dE 1 z dE dE 0 r 1 + zCIE = dE · 
In the short-run an individual bank will expand its lending by 
[4] Bundesbank, MR May 1975, p.27: 'In the model monetary policy 
acts on economic activity mainly through the provision of 
central bank money and through the lombard rate, which is 
regarded as the marginal rate of interest for central bank credit.' 
[5] Richer, R., McMahon, P. C., Regier, H. J. [1978], p.686 ff. 
See also Wills, H. R. [1979], p.8. 
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reducing its free liquid reserves. Consequently, for an individual 
bank dJt = - 1 or ~ ~ = i - z . 
By raising minimum reserve ratios and lowering rediscount 
quotas, for example, the Bundesbank is able to eliminate free liquid 
reserves and to put a bank in a position where it can only make 
additional loans by borrowing central bank money at increasing 
z interest rates. If the bank concerned is a price taker in 
the loan market, it would have to curtail its lending. Alternatively, 
it might attempt to attract more funds to maintain its lending by 
raising its deposit rates. The latter option would depend on the 
margin between its loan and deposit rates. 
Richer, McMahon and Regier argue, plausibly, that for the banking 
system as a whole the value of z must be corrected, because it needs 
to give up only a fraction of free liquid reserves for each loan 
of 1 OM. 
where: 
The correction is, in fact, the money multiplier: 
1 
m = _c_+_r~(-=-1---c-.--) 
c = currency ratio 
r = average reserve ratio on sight deposits, time deposits 
(of less than four years) and savings deposits at 
statutory notice. 
In the context of a highly integrated banking system such as 
the German one, this correction is indeed appropriate. 
for the banking system as a whole: 
i _ ~ = dK (dFR = _ l) 
m dE dE m • 
Hence, 
Again, by raising minimum reserve ratios, eliminating unutilised 
rediscount quotas and reducing the supply of money market paper 
included in its money market regulating arrangements, the Bundesbank 
would reduce the value of m. The resulting pressure on the money 
market would raise short-term interest rates and hence the cost 
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of additional central bank money. Consequently, the banking 
system would be compelled to raise its loan rates. 
It should be noted that an increase in the minimum reserve 
ratios provides a strong incentive for the banks to raise their 
loan rates, because the required reserve holdings are non-interest 
bearing. 
In general, the effectiveness of a restrictive monetary policy, 
as sketched, depends, firstly, on the speed at which the credit 
institutions raise their loan rates in response to the rising marginal 
cost of central bank money and, secondly, on the interest elasticity 
of the demand for bank loans. 
Whether a lowering of marginal costs of central bank finance 
would be able to stimulate a flagging demand for bank loans depends 
on the marginal efficiency of capital. If industry has a great 
deal of idle capacity and is operating at a loss, the return on 
capital investment becomes negative. Clearly, it is impossible 
to set a loan rate of interest below such a negative natural rate. 
The Bank's view that the effects of raising and lowering the marginal 
cost of central bank finance are symmetrical [6] would need to be 
qualified to exclude the case of a negative natural rate of interest [7]. 
At any rate, in terms of the theory of economic policy the marginal 
cost of central bank finance may be considered as the Bank's operating 
target. 
3.3 Monetary analysis 
For the purposes of its monetary analysis, the Bundesbank uses 
the consolidated balance sheet of the Bundesbank and the credit 
[6] Bundesbank [1980], p.37: 'Analog lMsst sich die Politik bei 
einer angestrebten Belebung der Geldsch~pfung einsetzen. • 
[7] Goudriaan, J. [1953], p.l53. 
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institutions as an accounting framework to identify the development 
of monetary aggregates as a result of all those balance sheet items 
which are not part of the money stock, as follows: 
[Lending by the monetary sector to domestic non-banks + net 
external claims] - [central bank balances of domestic public 
authorities +monetary capital formation from domestic sources, 
i.e. the banks• capital and reserves and other liabilities 
with a term in excess of 4 years] = M3; M3 - savings 
deposits at statutory notice = M2; M2 - term deposits 
with a term of less than 4 years= Ml. 
It is worthy of note that only domestic liabilities are part 
of the German money stock. External liabilities are excluded 
because they belong to what the Bundesbank calls the 11 financial sphere .. [8]. 
The accounting framework reflects the Bundesbank•s conviction that 
the credit institutions• liabilities are a function of their assets. 
Interest rates will have an impact on the volume of bank lending as 
well as on monetary capital formation, and depending on exchange rate 
policy, also on net external claims [9]. 
a) Monetary capital formation 
The close relationship between the German banking system 
and industry means that long-term funds are not necessarily obtained 
[8] 
[9] 
Bundesbank, MR July 1974, p.l9: only domestic liabilities 
are part of the German money stock. The Bundesbank•s external 
liabilities and the minimum reserve to be maintained by banks 
on external liabilities are not included. Although foreign 
demand is of great significance for economic activity, it 
is not directly connected with foreigners• deposits in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, which are primarily to be assigned to the financial sphere.• 
Bundesbank, AR 1972, p.25: •Monetary policy in Germany is guided 
by the basic-concept of cont~olling banks• supply of credit and 
the resultant increase in the money stock via bank liquidity and, 
in addition, of influencing non-banks• demand for credit by changing 
the interest rate level. • 
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from a supply of voluntary long-term saving, through the intermediary 
of the capital market. The credit institutions extend long-term loans, 
provided they have a reasonable amount of short-term liquidity. If 
this were lacking, they might, for example, reduce their portfolios of 
bonds. For prudential reasons, the Bundesbank is anxious to see that 
an expansion of bank lending is accompanied by an increase in monetary 
capital formation, because otherwise it might result in a perhaps undesir-
able expansion of M3 [10]. In this context, interest rate movements 
are seen as playing a role in controlling key monetary aggregates. 
An increase in interest rates decreases M3 and a decrease raises M3. 
The concept of monetary capital formation can be traced back to 
writers such as Wicksell and Wagner [11]. 
Wicksell, for example, drew a distinction between bank liabilities 
(deposits) which represent long-term savings and shorter-term deposits. 
As the former have been withdrawn from circulation they are unable to 
influence prices, unless the banks were to use them as a foundation for 
further lending [12]. 
In terms of Wickse11•s Austrian theory of capital, an extension of 
the roundaboutness of the production process financed by bank loans, 
can only be accomplished without rises in the prices of consumption 
goods if their consumption is reduced or, what amounts to the same thing, 
current saving is raised. Current savings would be reflected in monetary 
capital formation. 
The Bundesbank is aware that a higher amount of monetary capital 
formation could be used as a basis for more lending, but it does not emphasise 
[10] Bundesbank, MR June 1972, pp.8-12. 
[11] Marget, A. [1938/1966, Vol.I], pp.3ll-327. 
[12] Wic ksell, K. [1906/1935], p.87. 
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this [13]. Practically, the Bundesbank can only influence monetary 
capital formation through whatever influence it may have on long-
term rates of interest. 
b) Net external claims 
The item net external claims comprises the net acquisition 
by the banking system (including the Bundesbank) of external assets. 
It reflects, therefore, the net result of the external transactions 
of domestic enterprises and individuals. 
During the review period, 1979 was the only year when this item 
was negative on account of a deficit in the current account of the 
balance of payments. 
It is of some interest to note that a long-term (that is a term 
in excess of four years) time deposit bought by a non-resident and 
paid for in foreign currency would be reflected in M3, if the bank 
sold the foreign exchange to the Bundesbank. 
Since monetary capital formation from external sources is excluded 
from the monetary analysis, the OM equivalent of the foreign exchange 
would not be balanced by the corresponding liability and would 
hence result in an increase of M3, unless a correction were made 
in the analysis. 
c) Balances public authorities 
Every increase in the balances of the public authorities 
on account of domestic transactions reduces the money stock and 
vice versa. Should the Bundesbank direct the authorities to shift 
their balances, to the credit institutions, then the money stock 
[13] Bundesbank, MR June 1972, p. 12. 
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would rise, assuming the balances are short-term. The central 
bank money stock would also rise, although this is not reflected 
in the monetary analysis. 
3.4 A Wicksellian credit system approach 
The Bundesbank's monetary analysis emphasises the interdependence 
of bank assets and various bank liabilities. The money supply 
emerges as a residual variable. Clearly, the Bundesbank is unable 
to control effectively each of the variables, which in its analysis 
determine the money stock supply. Monetary capital formation and 
the balances of the public authorities are probably the least amenable 
to central bank control. Net external claims can only be controlled 
if the Bank is able to let the rate of exchange float without impedi-
ment, which would make them zero. 
Despite the introduction of floating rates of exchange in March 1973, 
the Bundesbank has regularly intervened in foreign exchange markets. 
On the one hand, this was necessary to comply with the so-called 
snake arrangement, now superseded by the European Monetary System. 
On the other hand, the Bundesbank has intervened in support of the 
USA dollar to avoid disorderly conditions in foreign exchange markets [14]. 
The interdependence of bank assets and bank liabilities combined 
with the Bundesbank's inability to control closely the various factors 
which determine monetary aggregates casts doubt on the suitability 
of Brunner and Meltzer's theory of intermediate variables for West Germany. 
Even if there were a long-run stable relationship between one 
particular factor and real GNP, it would still be of little help to 
the authorities. They have to take their decisions in the short 
[14] Bundesbank, AR 1974, p.60. 
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run [15]. 
In fact, the Bundesbank does not think in terms of one particular 
intermediate variable. In its monetary analysis it compares dis-
positions in respect of financial claims and liabilities with develop-
ments in the real economy. It has, therefore, a Wicksellian type 
of credit-system approach, which allows it to react flexibly according 
to the exigencies of the times. The combination of an all-purpose 
banking system with a close financial involvement of banks in industry 
comes, in fact, close to Wicksell •s description of an organised credit 
economy [16]. 
Inasmuch as monetary theories emphasise special features of a 
monetary economy, such as the money stock supply, real cash balances, 
the rate of interest, the cost of borrowing etc., the Bundesbank's 
theoretical orientation appears to be shifting all the time, whereas 
it simply focuses on a feature which appears to require most of its 
attention. By selecting quotations from the Bank's reports, it would 
be possible to classify the Bundesbank as monetarist, neo-Keynesian, 
liquidity-theoretic and so on. Such a procedure misses the point, 
however, that the Bundesbank has a credit system approach. Thus, 
Basler has attempted to pin down the Bundesbank's theoretical orientation 
on the basis of its actual choice of intermediate variables in the 
period 1958-1974 [17]. He concluded that the Bank was both Keynesian 
(credit availability/cost of borrowing theory) and quantity-theoretic. 
In some periods Keynesian, in others quantity-theoretic views dominated. 
[15] KBhler, Claus [1977], p.328. 
[16] Wicksell, K. [1898/1936], pp.62-81. 
[17] Basler, H. P. [1979], pp.l27-l30. 
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Basler surmised that this was so because the policymakers were basically 
concerned to carry out section 3 of the Bundesbank Act 1957, which 
refers indeed to both the volume of credit and the volume of money. 
Anyway, this result is not very satisfactory. In the Bundesbank's 
concept the variables of the monetary system are interrelated. 
So Basler has completely ignored the dependence of the money stock 
supply on the volume of credit and the significance of monetary capital 
formation as a link between the two. Surprisingly, monetary capital 
formation is not even mentioned once in Basler's study. 
The volume of credit and the money stock supply play, no doubt, 
key roles in the Bundesbank's view on the transmission process. 
But so does the banks' loan rate of interest. A case could be made 
for the loan rate of interest as key transmission variable in the 
Bundesbank's concept , but it would meet with the same objection as 
the volume of credit and the money supply if it were treated as the 
one and only intermediate variable. In some periods interest rates 
are more important to the Bank than in other ones. 
The Bundesbank's concept cannot be comprehended adequately in 
one or two intermediate variables. Its concept is much broader 
and covers the whole monetary sector as an interlocking system. 
The Bank endeavours to control this system in a number of ways. 
First, bank liquidity and hence bank credit is controlled through 
the marginal cost of central bank money. Second, a system of flexible 
rates of exchange should protect the domestic credit system against 
external shocks. Third, the Bank's medium-term monetary target is 
designed as a signal to indicate to government, business and unions 
how much finance the Bank is prepared to provide for additional spending. 
Should they fail to internalise this signal, they would have to bear 
the consequences, e.g. fail to get the money. The Bundesbank's 
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econometric model [18] lists public sector deficits, wage rates and external 
factors as autonomous causes of price rises, very much in the sense Wicksell 
described as 11 autonomous 11 factors outside of the central bank's control [19]. 
3.5 The link between the monetary and the real sector 
Assuming the Bundesbank has full control over the domestic credit 
system, how then would it construe the transmission of its policies to 
the real sector? The Bank's view of the transmission process has two 
elements. First, an interplay between the banks' loan rate and the 
natural rate of interest. Changes in the volume of bank lending are 
seen as closely related to changes in the relationship between these two 
interest rates. Second, the use that can be made of money once it has 
been created. 
a) Loan rate/natural rate 
In the Bank's view, what matters for borrowers is not so much 
the nominal interest burden compared with the prevailing inflation rate, 
but rather interest costs compared with the possible future return on 
the new investment [20]. Clearly, this distinction is very close to 
[18] Bundesbank, MR May 1975, p.28. 
[19] Uhr, C. G. [1960], p.293. 
[20] a) Irmler, H. [1972], pp.l38, 139: 'Every borrower compares the 
financial return on the investments he has financed on credit 
with the cost of interest on the credit. • (Dr. Irmler was a 
member of the Bundesbank Directorate throughout 1972-1979.) 
b) Bundesbank, MR May 1975: 11 Structure and results of the econometric 
model of theDeutsche Bundesbank 11 , p.27: 'Thus, the level of 
and changes in the real rate of interest play a part in enterprises' 
decisions on capital investment. In the model the yield on 
outstanding public bonds less the rate of change of the gross 
national product deflator is used as a rough indicator of the 
real rate of interest. • 
(contd.) 
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Wicksell's distinction between a natural rate of interest and the banks' 
loan rate, where the natural rate is thought of in marginal terms. 
In Uhr's review of the debate which followed the publication of 
Wicksell 's theory, mention is made of an objection of Wicksell's main 
opponent, Davidson, to the effect that the banks may raise their loan 
rate when the profitability of business increases, especially when there 
is a close relationship between banks and industry [21]. 
Wicksell, while accepting this possibility, did not find it compelling 
enough to abandon his whole mental construct. It bears more on the 
extent of the cumulative process than on the distinction between a natural 
rate and a loan rate. 
In Germany, the banks tend to adjust their loan rates in line with 
changes in the Bundesbank's rediscount rate. Their loan contracts stipulate 
that the interest rate will be adjusted when the rediscount rate changes. 
This applies in particular to short-term and medium-term loans. Thus, 
an increase in the natural rate could stimulate the demand for bank loans, 
given a certain loan rate. This development might induce the central 
bank to raise the rediscount rate, which, in turn, would force up the 
loan rate. 
[20] (contd.) 
c) Bundesbank, AR 1976, p.29: Having discussed the possible calculation 
of a real rate of interest by subtracting current price rises 
from the nominal interest rate, the Bank commented: 'However, 
it is not this "real rate of interest" as such which is important 
for business cycle policy but rather its relationship to the 
return on fixed assets ... Investment decisions primarily depend 
not on the overall relationship between the nominal interest 
burden and the prevailing inflation rate but rather on interest 
costs and the possible future return on the new investment for 
each investor ... • 
[21] Uhr, C. G. [1960], p.258: Davidson insisted that ... the effective 
alliance which exists between banks and industrial enterprises makes 
the real and the money rate of interest capable of simultaneous and 
parallel variation.' 
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The Bank•s model allows interest rates to affect incomes, 
prices and production, while monetary aggregates and interest rates, 
in turn, depend on developments in the real economy [22]. 
b) The use of money 
Notwithstanding its belief that bank liabilities arise 
out of bank lending, the Bundesbank is concerned that the volume 
of short-term bank liabilities (Ml, M2, M3) should remain within 
the limits set by the supply of output. The Bundesbank rejects, 
therefore, the real bills doctrine of self-liquidating bank loans [23]. 
Once money has been created, it can be used again, as former Bundesbank 
president Dr. Klasen put it [24]. Wicksell once made this point 
by quoting approvingly the Dutch economist Pierson, who had likened 
money to a shunting locomotive at a railway station. Once the 
locomotive is there, it can be used over and over again. Similarly, 
money remains always in the market, albeit in different hands [25]. 
[22] Bundesbank, MR May 1975, p.27. 
[23] For example, Bundesbank, MR April 1975, p.21: 1 The fact is ... 
that a central bank cannot assume that the trade bill and its 
conversion into money produce an automatic connection between 
non-monetary and monetary developments. The amount of the 
bill reflects goods and prices ... Bills are issued and discounted 
by enterprises because of a general need for credit ... • 
[24] Dr. K. Klasen, speech delivered on 24 October 1973, reproduced 
by the Bank of International Settlements, in its series 
of speeches by central bankers: •price movements in the 
Federal Republic are strongly influenced by the growth of 
the money supply ... For our monetary system produces a 
continuous expansion of the money supply through the banks• 
lending and the opportunity to use that credit in the form 
of deposit money too. • 
[25] Wicksell, K. [1906/1935], p. 19. 
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To put it another way, a distinction is drawn between the money stock 
and the utilisation thereof. The Bundesbank's analysis of the economy 
follows consistently the pattern of supply, demand and prices. If 
the volume of money becomes too large (the 11 monetary cloak 11 too wide) 
demand will outstrip supply, causing prices to rise. This may be 
compared with Wicksell's view that the general price level is determined 
by the total demand for and total supply of goods in the economy [26]. 
3.6 The demand for money 
In recent years the Bundesbank has shown a proclivity towards a demand 
for money to hold (portfolio balance theory) rather than a demand for 
money to spend. So the monetary aggregates M2 and M3 include financial 
assets which are bought and held as means of preparing for future payments. 
Since such assets function as precautionary or speculative stores of 
purchasing power, their volume is likely to be less volatile than the 
stock of means of payment (Ml) and hence, more amenable to monetary 
control. It is worthy of note that the Bundesbank has been looking 
for a monetary aggregate which is interest inelastic [27]. 
Conceivably, the Bank might wish to raise interest rates in order 
to restrain the amount of bank lending so as to reduce pressure on real 
resources. At the same time, as outlined above, it wishes to keep an 
eye on the development of monetary aggregates. Should the rise in 
[26] Wicksell, K. [1906/1935] . Also Hansen, B. [1951], p.2. 
[27] Bundesbank, MR February 1974, pp.8, 9. Having noted that savings 
deposits had~een shifted into time deposits and securities, 
the Bank commented: 'In these circumstances only an even 
broader definition, e.g. one including some types of saving deposits, 
such as those at statutory notice, would seem appropriate, as it 
would come nearest to being .. neutral .. as regards interest rates. 
Such a definition would, however, depart even further from the 
concept of money as an amount of payment media than M2 does, which 
is why it is not used in this context. • 
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interest rates cause economic subjects to reduce their spending and 
to invest in short-term highly liquid assets, then the decline of Ml 
could be misleading because in the near future spending could be fuelled 
by expiring time deposits [28]. The larger monetary aggregates (M2, 
M3), which are not so influenced by shifts from demand deposits into 
financial assets are, therefore, in the Bank's opinion, a better indicator 
of the demand for money [29]. 
There are problems with this view. For a start, the boundary 
line around the broader monetary aggregates is always arbitrary. 
Assets which have never been sensitive to interest rate changes might 
become so when the interest rate passes a certain threshold. In general, 
the more long-term/less liquid financial assets are included in a mone-
tary aggregate, the stabler it is [30] and the higher its correlation 
will be with an aggregate such as GNP, which is not likely to show large 
fluctuations either. 
[28] Bundesbank, AR 1979, p.24: the restrained growth of the money 
stock Ml in 1979 does not permit any reliable conclusions to be 
drawn as to the degree of restrictiveness of monetary policy, 
for it was attributable not to any general weakening of the demand 
for money but in part only to a shift out of highly liquid money 
holdings into forms of investment which are regarded by non-banks 
in almost the same way as liquid funds ... • 
[29] Bundesbank, AR 1979, pp.24, 25: 'The subdued trend of the money 
stock Ml is therefore more a measure of the 11monetary stimuli 11 
generated by the increase in short-term interest rates; it does 
not so readily allow any direct inferences to be drawn on the 
impact of monetary policy measures on the real economy ... Because 
of the ... finding that the more narrowly defined aggregates Ml 
and M2 may be subject to random fluctuations which lead to misinter-
pretations, the Bundesbank is primarily guided by the development 
of the broadly defined monetary aggregates M3 and central bank 
money stock, whose correlation with economic activity is comparatively 
stable in the medium term.• 
[30] See note 27 and also Bundesbank, AR 1977, p.22. 
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One could then argue that the broad monetary aggregate provides 
a good basis for a medium-term policy. The high correlation, however, 
does not reveal anything about causation. In principle, there are 
three possibilities. First, changes in GNP or economic activity cause 
corresponding changes in the monetary aggregate. Second, changes in 
the monetary aggregate bring about changes in economic activity. Third, 
changes in both the monetary aggregate and in economic activity are the 
result of another factor. The first two seem the most relevant as 
Oberhauser has pointed out [31]. They can be boiled down to the question 
whether, in the period considered, the central bank has been able to 
constrain the demand for credit and hence for money to spend. 
As such this question would bear upon the relationship between 
economic activity and Ml, means of payment. 
When wider monetary aggregates are considered, it should be borne 
in mind that decisions with regard to investment in financial assets 
involve a use of money which is different from decisions to use money 
as a means of payment. The former are made on the basis of money which 
is already available, because they concern financial portfolio assets, 
whereas the latter may require finance to be organised. 
For example, if economic subjects want to indulge in a spending 
spree, they will try to get hold of means of payment, amongst others 
by converting various financial assets into cash or by raising loans. 
As a result, Ml would tend to expand, whereas M2 and M3 might remain 
fairly stable. Furthermore, interest rates would rise and eventually 
check the spending spree. In this case, interest rates are, in the 
first instance, a dependent variable. Decisions on investment in financial 
[31] Oberhauser, A. [1976], pp.633, 634; Oberhauser, A. [1977], pp.216-220. 
- 62 -
assets, on the other hand, tend to be made in response to changes in 
interest rates. Thus, a reverse structure of interest rates, when 
short-term rates are higher than long-term rates, as occurred in Germany 
during 1979, might attract long-term funds into the short-end of the market. 
If these long-term funds would otherwise have been invested in financial 
assets not included in M3, M3 would show an increase unrelated to changes 
in spending on goods and services. 
Broader monetary aggregates such as M3 and M2 are the outcome of 
decisions involving at least two different functions of money, money 
as a means of payment and money as a store of value. The Bundesbank's 
practice of calling Ml, M2 and M3 all money, albeit in a narrow, a wide 
and a widest definition respectively, is confusing. 
In the recession year of 1975, for example, the Bundesbank stressed 
the need for using both the Ml and the M2 definition. Whereas Ml had 
expanded, M2 had grown very slowly. Ml seemed to indicate a potential 
for inflation and M2 that the reflationary policy had been ineffective [32]. 
In actual fact, the divergence was due to the lower velocity of circulation 
of Ml in a time of recession. The cash balances were not invested 
either because of uncertainty or because the rate of interest was too 
low. 
3.7 The Bundesbank's monetary indicator-cum-monetary growth target 
The Bank's preference for broad monetary aggregates is revealed 
in its choice of the Central Bank Money Stock (CBMS) as basic monetary 
indicator. For this purpose, CBMS is defined as the total of the minimum 
reserve balances the credit institutions are required to hold against 
their domestic liabilities at the Bundesbank, calculated on the basis 
[32] Bundesbank, AR 1975, p.ll. 
- 63 -
of the minimum reserve ratios prevailing in January 1974, and augmented 
with the amount of currency in the hands of the public (prior to 1978, 
currency in the hands of the banks was also included). While the 
minimum reserve balances constitute a fraction of the bank liabilities 
on which they are levied, currency in the hands of the public is incorporated 
in total. 
CBMS was chosen as a monetary indicator in 1973 because, firstly, 
the liabilities of the central bank are related to the credit institutions• 
creation of deposit money; secondly, CBMS as a monetary aggregate is relatively 
interest-rate inelastic and, finally, it is very quickly measurable. 
CBMS would represent the entire expansion made possible by the central 
bank [33]. 
CBMS should not be confused with the actual central bank money 
stock which would include currency in circulation, required minimum 
reserve holdings on domestic liabilities (calculated at actual reserve 
ratios), excess reserve holdings, public authority balances, deposits 
of foreigners at the Bundesbank and minimum reserve holdings on external 
liabilities. CBMS serves rather as a proxy for the domestic money 
stock outstanding (M3). 
If currency in circulation is defined as C, time deposits as T, 
demand deposits as D, savings deposits as S and the minimum reserve 
ratios of January 1974 as t, d and s respectively and means •constant•, 
then: 
CBMS = C + dD + tT + sS, whereas 
M3 = C + D + T + S. 
As long as the •multiplier• is constant, movements in CBMS would indicate 
past movements in M3. 
[33] Bundesbank, AR 1974, p.25. 
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It should not be thought, however, that the Bundesbank believes 
that it can control movements in M3 by manipulating the central bank money 
stock. CBMS is not so much a monetary base, but rather an indicator 
of past movements in M3. Control of actual M3 depends on the control 
of bank liquidity, bank lending etc. (See Bundesbank letter in Appendix 1.) 
Should actual M3 be larger than desired M3, as represented by CBMS, 
then monetary policy will be tightened up. 
When at the end of 1974 the Bundesbank decided to commit itself 
publicly to the attainment of a monetary growth target, it chose CBMS 
as the target variable. Recently, Dr. Bockelmann, a Bundesbank official, 
explained that CBMS was selected for this role because it had had an 
elasticity of one with respect to GNP during the period of 1960-1973. 
Unfortunately, after 1973, CBMS grew faster than GNP, because of the fast 
growth of the currency component [34]. 
The gist of this view is that CBMS was chosen for purely statistical 
reasons, a procedure which is known as measurement without theory. 
One would wish to know why CBMS should have an elasticity of one and whether 
the growth rate of CBMS is a stable function of nominal GNP or whether 
it is the other way round. The experience subsequent to 1973 indicates 
that a choice based on past statistics is not without its problems. 
It now remains to be seen how CBMS as a proxy for M3 performs in 
comparison with actual M3. Table 3.1 sets out various cases in which 
financial assets are bought and sold during a certain period. The mini-
mum reserve ratios are the constant ratios at which CBMS is assumed to 
be calculated. 
[34]Bockelmann, H. [1980], p.l67. 
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Table 3.1 
Offsetting Changes in Liabilities of Credit Institutions and their Effects 
on M3 (actual) and CBMS (calculated at assumed constant minimum reserve 
ratios, being 12.45% on Sight Deposits; 8.65% on Time Deposits less than 
four years; and 6.3% on Savings Deposits at Statutory Notice). Each 
----------------------S~~~-i~Y2!Y~~-~!QQ _________________________________ _ 
Case Initial Position New Position M3 CBMS 
Time Deposit 5 years Sight Deposit +100 +12.45 
2 Sight Deposit Currency 0 +87.55 
3 Savings Deposit Stat . Not. Time Deposit <4 yr. 0 + 2.35 
4 Sight Deposit Time Deposit <4 yr. 0 - 3.80 
5 Savings Deposit Stat.Not. Currency 0 +93.70 
6 Time Deposit < 4 years Debenture Stock 1 -100 - 8.65 
7 Loan Bank Reduction Overdraft 0 0 
8 Loan Bank Sight Deposit +100 +12.45 
1Bought from a bank. 
Case 1 
A financial asset, not included in any monetary aggregate is 
transformed into a sight deposit. CBMS indicates a growth which is equal 
to the amount of the sight deposit multiplied by the constant reserve ratio 
on sight deposits . The Bundesbank must decide whether this indication 
of a growth in M3 is acceptable. 
Case 2 
A sight deposit is converted into currency. M3 remains unchanged. 
Yet CBMS increases substantially. It gives a wrong indication of the 
development of M3 owing to the 100 percent incorporation of currency in 
CBMS. It is assumed, of course, that the central bank has actually made 
the extra currency available. 
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Case 3 
In response to increased interest rates on time deposits, 
a savings deposit at statutory notice is transformed into a short-term 
time deposit. This is, in fact, a move towards a less liquid position. 
Whereas there is no change in M3, CBMS increases because of the different 
reserve ratios on time deposits and savings deposits. It could be argued 
that CBMS is slightly more sensitive to changes in interest rates than 
M3. 
Case 4 
Like the previous case, this is a move towards a less liquid 
position, as a sight deposit is converted into a time deposit. Contrary 
to the previous case, however, CBMS declines. To put it differently, 
in Case 3 CBMS gives a better indication of M2 than of M3 and in Case 4 
it indicates Ml better than M3. 
Case 5 
A savings deposit is withdrawn and paid out in currency. 
CBMS registers a large increase, almost equal to the rise in Ml. Yet 
M3 is not changed at all. Like in Case 2, it is assumed that during 
the period considered, the Bundesbank was prepared to make the additional 
currency available. 
Case 6 
On its expiry, a term deposit is used to buy a bond from a 
bank. This is not necessarily a move towards a less liquid position. 
If interest rates were falling, the bond might be disposed of quickly 
at a profit. The decrease in CBMS and in M3 may or may not be right. 
Cases 7 and 8 
concern a bank loan against which a cheque is drawn which 
is paid by the recipient into an account in overdraft in Case 7, and added 
to a demand deposit in Case 8. Case 7 demonstrates that an increase 
in bank lending does not necessarily give rise to an increase in bank 
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liabilities. Its effect might be limited to a change in bank assets. 
The conclusion from the cases examined is that CBMS is by 
no means a perfect indicator of M3. The currency component of CBMS, 
in particular, can produce major distortions. As an indicator of what 
M3 should be, CBMS has a certain margin of error, which might well be 
acceptable for this purpose. 
The cases just discussed make it clear that CBMS changes in 
response to decisions of economic subjects other than the central bank, 
although the latter may have an indirect influence through its interest 
rate and bank liquidity policies. One can agree, therefore, with the 
Bundesbank that it is not a monetary base. 
The calculation of CBMS at constant reserve ratios is unobjection-
able as it is intended to be an indicator of M3. In practice, one can 
either use the reserve ratios as they were at a certain date in the past 
or the reserve ratios as they are in the present. The Bundesbank has 
adopted the former method and uses the reserve ratios of January 1974. 
This method is acceptable as long as, subsequent to January 1974, the 
actual minimum reserve ratios do not change relative to each other. 
If they do so change, however, there may arise a different systematic 
relationship between CBMS and other monetary aggregates or real GNP, as 
Duwendag has noted [35]. The use of current minimum reserve ratios, 
to calculate CBMS backwards in time, would overcome this problem. 
The calculation of the monetary growth target is clearly 
inspired by Prof. Claus KBhler's idea of a monetary policy which is oriented 
to the production potential of the economy [36]. The calculation consists 
[35] Duwendag, D. [1976], p.290. To o~etcome thi~ problem Duwendag 
suggests that the present minimum reserve ratios be used to 
calculate a past time series of CBMS. 
[36] KBhler, Claus [1977], pp.319-357. 
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of the following estimations: 
a. The growth rate of potential production, by means of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. 
b. The change in the utilisation of productive capacity. 
c. Unavoidable price rises, such as planned changes in indirect taxes 
or import price rises . 
For example, the target for 1977 was calculated as: 
+3% in production potential +2% in capacity utilisation = +5% real growth. 
Price rises should be less than 4%. 
Allowing for a slight increase in the velocity of circulation of 
1 percent, the target was set at 8 percent for that year [37]. The validity 
of this calculation hinged, of course, on the presumed stable relationship 
between CBMS (Note: not the actual central bank money stock) and nominal 
GNP. It so happened, however, that the velocity of circulation, i.e. 
the ratio of GNP to the CBMS indicator declined in the period 1975-1978, 
contrary to expectations. Addressing itself to this problem in 1977, 
the Bundesbank identified about six possible causes [38], but concluded 
candidly that it did not really know for lack of information. Consequently, 
the Bank has ceased to make precise estimates of the velocity of circulation. 
Deviations from the annual targets caused the Bank to note [39] that 
it was really pursuing a medium-term policy of controlling M3 and hence 
[37] Bundesbank, AR 1976, p.22. 
[38] Bundesbank, AR 1977, pp.22-24. The six factors were: 1) Unanticipated 
changes in economic activity 2) Unexpected inflows of foreign 
exchange 3) Changes in the distribution of income (a sharp increase 
in pensions) 4) A substantial reduction in interest rates and 
in inflationary expectations 5) Growing importance of the •grey• 
area in the economy which requires cash payments 6) Higher holdings 
of OM notes abroad to speculate on an appreciation of the 0-Mark. 
[39] Bundesbank, AR 1977, p.22. 
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nominal GNP, although it did not define the length of the medium-term. 
The idea behind the monetary growth target is that the public should 
know how much money the central bank is prepared to make available for 
additional spending [40]. If wage rates, for instance, were raised in 
a way which would cause price increases to exceed the target figure, the 
Bundesbank•s policy would be found to be restrictive. Thus, the Bank 
has attempted to eliminate the autonomous causes of price rises. The 
success of this strategy depends crucially on whether trade unions, employers 
and the government are willing to let themselves be circumscribed by the 
target. Business enterprises might try to circumvent it by borrowing 
abroad, particularly if the Bank reacted to unfavourable wage settlements 
by raising interest rates. 
In principle, the introduction of a monetary target has made the 
Bundesbank•s policy of controlling the credit institutions• secondary 
liquidity by means of changes in the marginal cost of central bank money 
more predictable. 
3.8 The term structure of interest rates 
At first sight the idea of controlling a monetary target appears to 
be inconsistent with the Bundesbank•s wish to control also the long-term 
rate of interest as it relates to the natural rate of interest. This 
ambiguity is more apparent than real. If the loan rate of interest is 
equal to the natural rate, then the pace of business investment will be 
in line with the rate of growth of real resources and bank lending would 
not create an excessive amount of money. Nevertheless, the growth and 
[40] For example: Bundesbank, AR 1976, p.22: 1 Through the announcement 
of this target all those involved in economic activity are confronted 
with the question of how their behaviour can be reconciled with this 
aim. • 
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use of the money stock should be watched. After all, the money supply 
is not only influenced by bank lending, but also by public sector deficits. 
Moreover, the money income flows generated by a given stock may be unaccept-
able. In terms of linear programming concepts, it could be put this 
way: minimise the difference between the loan rate of interest and the 
natural rate, provided the money stock supply does not grow more rapidly 
than real GNP. 
The problem is what the relationship is, in the Bundesbank•s view, 
between its money market policies and the long-term rate of interest. 
Basically, monetary economics offers three competing hypotheses 
of the term structure of interest rates. 
a. The expectations hypothesis asserts that the current long-term rate 
is a combination of future short-term rates and that securities with 
different terms to maturity, but otherwise equal, can be substituted 
for each other. Cross-elasticities are infinitely high. 
b. The liquidity hypothesis emphasises that the liquidity of short-term 
financial assets is superior to that of long-term ones. Lenders 
prefer to lend short-term, whereas borrowers prefer to borrow 
long. It requires a higher yield on long-term securities to 
reconcile the difference. 
c. The segmented market hypothesis assumes that lenders and borrowers 
have distinct preferences for particular maturities. Cross-
elasticities between financial assets with varying terms 
to maturity will be low (but not zero), so that security 
markets are segmented. Changes in the maturity structure 
of securities supplied to a particular financial market 
will cause changes in the term structure of interest rates. 
The Bundesbank•s view on the term structure of interest rates in 
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the bond market can be described as follows [41]. 
In general, the yields on Federal Government bonds are slightly 
lower than average, because such bonds are considered to be highly liquid, 
owing to regular price support operations. The yields of industrial 
bonds, comm unal bonds and mortgage bonds tend to be higher than average, 
the bonds being less liquid. 
According to the Bank: 
... the market rates bonds with varying maturities differently 
if they are identical in all other respects ... The size and 
direction of the yield differentials relative to the (remaining) 
period to maturity fluctuate quite considerably. [42] 
The chart (Figure 3.2) gives a good idea of the variability of yield 
curves in the period 1967-1978. Expectations of falls or rises in the 
level of long-term interest rates, for example, have played a role in 
this. "Pure" interest rate expectations, however, are only one factor 
in the determination of yield curves. Other factors are: 
... the liquidity wishes of market operators with corresponding 
preferences for particular (remaining) periods to maturity. 
[43] 
The Bundesbank has calculated yield curves for the bond market covering 
the whole period since 1967 (when interest rates were exempted from controls), 
using the formula: Y = a + b(T) + c ln(T) + u, where Y = yield, T = 
term to maturity, a = constant, b and c = coefficients for the linear 
and logarithmic effects and u =residual. 
[41] Bundesbank, MR April, 1978: 'Interest Rate Movements and Changes 
in the Interest Rate Structure in the Federal Republic of Germany 
since 1967' (pp.ll-21) . 
[42] Op.cit., p.l6. 
[43] Op.cit., p.l6. 
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This equation was not determined on a priori grounds, but as part 
of an attempt to fit a curve to the observations [44]. The equation 
implies that the relationship between the yield and the term to maturity 
is not strictly linear. 
Summing up, the Bundesbank 1 s view can be characterised as favouring 
the segmented market hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. 
The role of liquidity preference and expectations is also recognised, 
however. This is not illogical, because the segmented market hypothesis 
lends itself easily to an ab~orption of elements of competing hypotheses, 
such as expectations and liquidity premiums [45]. 
As this is not a quantitative study, an empirical verification of 
the segmented market hypothesis is contained in Appendix 3. 
3.9 Analysis of the Bank 1 S view on the term structure of interest rates 
Since the Bundesbank acts as a monopolist in the money market, interest 
rates in that market, as well as in other markets in which its instruments 
have an impact, must be unpredictable to othe~ than the Bank itself, simply 
because the actions of one man or one institution are unpredictable. 
This tendency is reinforced by the oligopolistic behaviour of the credit 
institutions. With a small number of market participants, it seems 
inevitable that intricate patterns of action and reaction will emerge. 
Reaction, of course, can be either positive or negative. What this means 
is that the Bundesbank should not only base the use of its instruments 
[44] Op.cit., p.l8: 1 A compromise ... has to be found between a polynomial 
of low degree, the statistical explanatory value of which is relatively 
small but which is simple and informative for interest rate policy 
purposes, and a polynomial of a higher degree, the statistical explanatory 
value of which is greater but which shows the overall trend of the 
curve less clearly. 1 By experiment the equation as quoted was found 
to be the optimal one in terms of this compromise. 
[45] Thus, e.g. Culbert~on, J. M. [1977], p.280. 
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on an analysis of the economic situation, but also on an estimate of 
the possible reactions of credit institutions in the various financial 
markets, along with the reactions of other market participants. 
Haverkamp [46] has given an insider's account of reaction patterns 
in the bond market during the period 1978-1979. Significant psychological 
factors were: 
a. Expectations such as: (i) W. Germany will follow Japan and Switzerland 
and introduce controls on the inflow of capital. (ii) The deficit 
of the public sector will increase. (iii) The Bundesbank will 
implement a restrictive policy, because central bank money stock 
is expanding in excess of the target rate. Such expectations, 
of course, may or may not come true. Even if the Bank 
were to implement a restrictive policy, its shape and 
degree of severity could vary considerably. 
b. Such expectations are usually exaggerated. 
c. When a particular expectation has gripped the market, only news 
which reinforces it is considered and news to the contrary is ignored. 
d. Institutional investors think in terms of thresholds. If the rate 
for, say, 10-year bonds has hit the 7 percent mark and then declines, 
investors believe that the rate will return to the 7 percent level, 
an expectation which is self-fulfilling. 
e. A small group of market participants. As a rule they will know 
each other. No participant likes to stand out from his colleagues 
by decisions which do not conform to the majority opinion about 
the trend of the market. The advantage of this is that, should 
subsequently the market develop differently than generally expected, 
every participant is able to say that everybody else was wrong too. 
[46] Haverkamp, H. [1979], pp.405-421. 
f. 
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Haverkamp compares this behaviour aptly with that of lemmings. 
Announcement effects of measures taken by the Bundesbank. For 
example, the increase in the Lombard rate in January 1979 took 
the bond market completely by surprise. It was interpreted 
as a sign that interest rates were going to move up. 
The value of this analysis is that it shows that the market does 
not use all available information, contrary to the idea of the efficient 
market hypothesis . The market selects information. Another interesting 
aspect of Haverkamp•s story is that the inflow of foreign capital early 
in 1978 was directed to the bond market, whereas the inflow in October/ 
November of the same year benefited the money market. Such switches 
can only increase the indeterminate character of interest rate movements. 
Like Haverkamp, Goudriaan [47] has pointed out the psychological factors 
which make interest rates indeterminate. In addition to Haverkamp•s 
factors, he paid attention to speculative stocks. Thus, an increase 
in the price of financial assets may induce a speculative demand, but 
also curtail the supply at the same time. These two factors are likely 
to reinforce each other. 
Indeterminate movements in short-term interest rates do not rule 
out, of course, an interrelationship between short-term and long-term 
rates. Since financial markets in Germany are closely interlinked through 
the banking system, movements in the money market are likely to have an 
effect on the capital market and vice versa. The capital market, however, 
is not only influenced by the money market, but also by the supply of 
and demand for long-term funds (monetary capital formation). 
[47] Goudriaan, J. [1953], pp.90-97. 
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3.10 Ultimate objectives 
The Bundesbank firmly believes that in the absence of price stability, 
economic growth and a high level of employment cannot be achieved [48]. 
Commemorating the currency reform of 1948, Dr. Emminger stated that creeping 
inflation: 
does not promote growth and employment... Inflation has frequently 
resulted in low real growth and in unemployment, the reason being 
that it increasingly turns productive forces to unproductive but 
seemingly inflation-proof uses, disorganises national economies, 
reduces their competitiveness and obliges economic policy to 
pursue a course of 11 Stop and go 11 on balance of payments grounds. 
[49] 
In the literature, the monetary theories inspired by the Austrian 
theory of capital have linked price stability and/or neutral money with 
the attainment of full employment. 
level should be stable. 
In Wicksell 's version the price 
The advantages of a boom accompanied by rising prices are more apparent 
than rea 1. Usually, the boom results in an over-expansion of credit and 
hence in an economic crisis [50]. 
Creeping inflation is not much use either, because its advantages 
are lost as soon as it is anticipated. A lasting fall in the price 
level is likewise undesirable, because it paralyses business and causes 
unemployment. The goal of price stability should be attained by making 
sure that the banks' loan rate equals the natural rate of interest, being 
the marginal value productivity of real capital or the expected yield on 
newly created real capital. Should the natural rate be higher than the 
loan rate, then the demand for capital goods would expand and push up prices. 
[48] E.g. Bundesbank, AR 1979, p.l; AR 1978, p.l. 
[49] Bundesbank, MR June 1978: Dr. Emminger, 0. '30 Year Currency', 
pp.8, 9. -
[50] Wicksell, K. [1898/1936], p. 1. 
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In turn, this would raise profits and thus stimulate business. National 
income would rise and if the expansion failed to generate sufficient 
savings, to cover higher investment, the higher prices of consumption 
goods would compel forced saving. 
This theory leads to the view that a monetary policy which manages 
to equate the loan rate and the natural rate would remove the root cause 
of the business cycle. The authorities would then be in a position to 
tackle any remaining employment problems [51]. Following this approach, 
the Bundesbank has insisted recently that the unemployment problem has 
two parts; one part which is amenable to measures of general economic 
policy, and another part which is structural and requires selective measures 
of labour market policy [52]. In general, German thinking, as laid down 
in the Bundesbank Act 1957, and in the Act to Promote Economic Stability 
and Growth 1967, is that monetary and fiscal policy are to play distinct 
roles, which should be co-ordinated. The latter Act involves also a 
specific commitment to the framework of a free market economy. For 
this reason, the Bundesbank is not in favour of imposing quantitative 
restrictions on bank credit, but seeks to achieve its goals via the market. 
3.11 The Bank's reaction function 
The Bundesbank attempts to achieve its goal of price stability by 
insulating the domestic credit system through flexible rates of exchange 
against external disturbances. Its monetary growth target is to provide 
a signal to other economic subjects how far they can go in respect of wage 
rates, prices and public sector deficits. Compliance with the target 
[51] Uhr, C. G. [1960], p.249. 
[52] Bundesbank, AR 1977, p.5. 
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would enable the Bundesbank to control successfully the operations of 
the credit system, particularly by setting the marginal cost of central 
bank money such that the difference between the banks• loan rate and the 
natural rate of interest is minimised subject to the monetary aggregate 
M3 remaining within bounds set by the ultimate goal of price stability. 
In the Bundesbank•s view the monetary sector is an interlocking 
system. The Bank•s monetary control can be thought of in linear programming 
terms. If a particular variable is to be minimised or maximised, side 
conditions will be imposed on other important variables. 
- 79 -
CHAPTER FOUR THE BUNDESBANK 1 S MONETARY POLICY 
4.1 Failed insulation of the domestic credit system 
Apart from a brief period in 1973, the Bundesbank has been unable 
to pursue rigorously a policy of flexible rates of exchange during the 
years 1972-1979. Interventions in foreign exchange markets were neces-
sary. 
First, to maintain stable rates of exchange within the bloc of 
European currencies known as the 11 Snake 11 (now the European Monetary System). 
Second, to maintain orderly market conditions. Third, to moderate 
excessive fluctuations in the OM-USA rate. Nonetheless, in the Bank•s 
view, interventions should not, and indeed cannot, counteract fundamental 
trends in the market [1]. Basically, the Bundesbank blames a lack of 
confidence in important currencies such as the USA dollar, which, in 
turn, is caused by inflation, for the Deutsche Mark•s role as a currency 
of refuge [2]. 
Table 4.1 shows that the net increase in the central bank money 
stock in the period 1972-1979 was OM 52.4 billion. This net increase 
consisted of OM 95.0 billion increases and OM 42.6 billion decreases. 
Of the factors causing an increase, the central bank•s purchases 
of foreign exchange accounted for 75 percent of the total and increases 
in the balances of the public authorities for 12 percent. The conclusion 
must be that the domestic credit system has not been adequately safe-
guarded against .. autonomous .. causes of monetary instability. 
The behaviour of labour costs reinforces this conclusion, as indicated 
by Table 4.2. 
[1] Bundesbank, AR 1974, p.60. 
[2] Bundesbank, AR 1971, p.46; AR 1974, p.32; AR 1972, p.37. 
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Table 4.1 
Net Changes in the Supply of Central Bank Money 1972-1979 OM Billion 
+ = increase; - = decrease in supply of central bank money 
Purchases of foreign exchange by the Bundesbank 
Changes in the balances of the accounts of 
Federal Government and LHnder at Bundesbank 
Changes in the balances of other non-credit institutions 
at the Bundesbank 
Float 
Other factors (interbank money market) 
Open-market operations with non-credit institutions, 
in N-paper and long-term securities 
Open-market operations with credit institutions under 
repurchase agreements 
Foreign exchange swaps 
Special and temporary Lombard facility 
Changes in required minimum reserves 
Minimum reserves on external liabilities 
Total increase in central bank money 
In addition the free liquid reserves were increased on 
account of the following factors: 
Changes in rediscount quotas 
Changes in the money market indebtedness of non-credit 
institutions to credit institutions 
Total 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports 
Table 4.2 
+71.0 
+ ll .l 
- 1.6 
+ 4.0 
-29.4 
- 8.3 
- 0. l 
- 2.4 
+ 4.2 
+ 4.7 
- 0.8 
+52.4 
+ 4.3 
+ 6.0 
+10.3 
Percentage Changes in Wages and Salaries per Employee compared with 
-----~~~l_§~2~~-Q2~~~!1~-~~29~~!_e~~-~~el2~~~-~~~129_l~ZQ:l~Z~-----
Period 
1970-1973 
1974-1979 
Annual Average Percentage Increase 
Wages and Salaries Gross Domestic Real 
per employee Product per Employee 
11.9 
7.2 
4. l 
3. l 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports, January 1980 (article: 
1 The Growth of Productivity in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and its Determinants 1 , p.l2), May 1980 
- 81 -
The experience in the period 1974-1979 (Table 4.2) is revealing 
because it coincided, except for the initial year, with the Bank•s experi-
ment with an annual monetary growth target. Apparently, the targets 
failed to convince the social partners of the need to raise wages by 
not more than the overall growth of labour productivity so as to maintain 
price stability. 
Summarising, the Bundesbank had to contend with major problems 
in its control of the domestic financial system: foreign exchange inflows, 
government deficits and excessive wage rises. 
4.2 The balance of payments 
To the extent that the Bundesbank is prepared to buy foreign 
exchange from the credit institutions or the latter are able to sell 
foreign exchange and to invest the proceeds in assets eligible as free 
liquid reserves, bank liquidity is increased. Table 4.3 sets out the 
changes in the Bundesbank•s holdings of external assets. The Bank•s 
net purchases of foreign exchange in 1972, 1973, 1976 and 1978 must 
have had an expansionary effect on the liquidity of credit institutions 
and net sales in 1974, 1975, 1977 and 1979 a contractionary effect. 
Table 4.3 
Changes in the Bundesbank•s Holdings of External Assets (Balances with 
foreign banks and Money Market Investment abroad). Percentage changes 
At end of 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
March 16.2 68.1 - 6.0 -15.4 6.1 -11.7 27.2 - 3.3 
June 31.4 34.8 - 3.0 -24.2 5.6 - 5.7 25.6 -23.5 
September 36.9 40.7 -25.4 -16.8 23.0 - 7.7 35.3 -26.0 
December 38.7 26.0 -24.4 3.1 1.4 12. 1 27.9 -30.5 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Month1~ Reports 
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Table 4.4 indicates that the credit institutions themselves 
have also been accumulating external assets throughout the review period, 
with the exception of 1972. 
Table 4.4 
Credit Institutions• Holdings of External Assets - Percentage Increase 
__________________ Q~~~-Q~~-Y~~~-~gg __________________________________ _ 
At end of 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
March 0.7 -4.5 7.8 32.7 33.3 10.2 10.2 11.0 
June -1.0 0.7 13.5 32.7 23.8 11.9 8.6 11.9 
September -1.5 4. l 15.4 42.7 12.7 12.3 7.9 10.0 
December -3.4 14.6 25.7 40.9 13.3 7.8 9.2 6.9 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthl~ Re~orts 
The recession of 1974/75 saw the greatest accumulation. 
This suggests that the credit institutions might have substituted external 
assets for free liquid reserves during periods of slack economic activity. 
In view of the uncertainties prevailing in a recession, banks are cautious 
and invest their liquid funds in bonds and other securities rather than 
trying to expand their loans. The Bundesbank•s attempt to implement 
a stimulating monetary policy to overcome the recession, therefore, failed 
to generate the expected response on the part of the banking system. 
It goes without saying that the balance of payments, and 
in particular the overall balance which indicates whether there has been 
a net inflow or outflow of funds, is of major importance for the liquidity 
of the banking system. Table 4.5 shows that there was a net inflow 
of funds, mainly due to transactions on current account, during the 
review period. 
f 
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Table 4.5 
Balance of Payments - 1972-1979 -OM Billions 
Balance Capita 1 Accounts Balance 
Year Current Ace. Total Short-Term All Transactions 
1972 + 2.6 +12.0 - 3.5 +15.7 
1973 +12.3 +13.2 + ·0.3 +26.4 
1974 +26.6 -25.3 -19.1 - 1. 9 
1975 + 9.9 -13.3 + 5.0 - 2.2 
1976 + 9. 7 - 0.1 + 0.5 + 8.8 
1977 + 9.8 - 0.8 +12.2 +10.5 
1978 +17.5 + 5.8 + 8.5 +19.8 
1979 -10.5 + 9.7 - 1.0 - 5.0 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthl~ ReEorts 
4.3 The Eublic authorities' finance 
According to Table 4.6 the total indebtedness of the public 
authorities has increased continuously during the period 1972-1979. 
Depending on the way in which they are financed, public 
sector deficits can have a major impact on bank liquidity. For example, 
if Treasury Bills and Discountable Treasury Bonds are issued and included 
in the Bundesbank's money market regulating arrangements, the credit 
institutions' free liquid reserves will rise. To eliminate this pos-
sibility, the Bank has been issuing N-paper, which must be held until 
maturity, in recent years. This might have caused the banks to obtain 
cash by selling bonds, thereby raising yields on the bond market. 
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Table 4.6 
Total Indebtedness of Public Authorities - Percentage Change over one 
-------------------------~~~~-~92 ____________________________________ 
End 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
March 13.6 11.6 2.3 20.7 33.0 13.3 14.2 12.5 
June 13.4 9.4 4.4 25.9 27.1 14.5 12.5 13.9 
Sept. 12.8 8.3 7.6 30.5 24.1 11.0 15.0 10.6 
Dec. 11.2 7.5 14.7 33.3 15.7 10.7 12.9 11.8 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthl~ Re~orts 
4.4 Some key facts of monetar~ analysis 
The impact of public sector borrowing and the inflow of foreign 
capital can be deduced from the scheme of the Bundesbank's monetary 
analysis: [domestic lending by the banking system+ net external assets] -
[public sector balances +monetary capital formation] = Money Supply. 
The key variables rose at the following compound rates during 
the review period: 
Domestic lending by credit institutions to others 
Monetary Capital Formation (long-term bank liabilities) 
Ml (means of payment) 
11.0% 
11.5% 
9.8% 
By way of comparison, the following variables are of interest: 
Cost of Living Index All Groups 
Index of Net Industrial Production 
5.0% 
2.3% 
The similar growth rates of bank lending and monetary capital 
formation mean that the sharp growth of Ml must have originated in net 
external claims and the finances of the public authorities. 
The considerable monetary expansion notwithstanding, the rate 
of price increases has been moderate. 
This raises the question to what extent, if any, monetary policy 
has contributed to this favourable result. 
In terms of the Bundesbank's basic concept, an effective monetary 
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policy would require the amount of potential central bank money (free 
liquid reserves) to be as close to zero as technically possible. 
The Bundesbank is only able to control bank liquidity by manipulating 
the marginal cost of central bank money if this condition is met. 
For an examination of this point, the review period can be divided, 
roughly speaking, into the following subperiods: 
a. End 1971-end September quarter 1972 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Dec. quarter 1972-Sept. quarter 1974 
Dec. quarter 1974-Dec. quarter 1978 
1979-
Policy not restrictive 
Restrictive policy 
Stimulative policy 
Restrictive policy. 
Table 4.7 makes it clear that during periods of restrictive 
policies, the ratio of free liquid reserves to central bank money was 
indeed quite low, whereas it tended to be relatively high during stimu-
lative periods. Table 4.7 further demonstrates that the Bundesbank, 
consistent with its concept, implemented its restrictive policies by 
raising the marginal costs of central bank finance, as proxied by the 
normal Lombard rate of interest. 
An interesting aspect of the stimulative periods is that the 
credit institutions had a large supply of potential central bank money, 
so that they could have expanded their lending much more than they actually 
did. This underlines again that banks respond asymmetrically to monetary 
policy. They respond as intended to restrictive policies, but not to 
stimulating policies during a recession. 
The information provided by the ratio of free liquid reserves 
to central bank money may be used to interpret diagrams 4.1 and 4.2 
which set out the relationship between Bundesbank lending to credit 
institutions in real terms and net industrial production and between 
changes in bank lending to industry in real terms and changes in industrial 
production respectively. The linear product moment correlation coefficients 
were 0.58 and 0.69 respectively. 
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Table 4.7 
The Ratio of Free Liquid Reserves to CBMS compared with the (normal) 
Lombard Rate of Interest- Period 1972-1979- % 
Ratio of Free Liquid Lombard Ratio of Free Liquid Lombard 
As at end of Reserves to CBMS Rate Reserves to CBMS Rate 
1972 March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1973 March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1974 March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1975 March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1976 March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1977 March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1978 March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1979 March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
% % 
Restrictive Periods 
8.3 
2.2 
1.9 
3.0 
3. 1 
2.3 
1.6 
2.0 
2.8 
2.5 
1.9 
2.8 
6.5 
7.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
5.0 
5.5 
6.0 
7.0 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports 
% % 
Stimulative Periods 
16.3 
19.3 
7.0 
4.5 
10.5 
8.7 
12.3 
13.5 
13.6 
9.8 
5.2 
6.1 
4.3 
6.6 
8.4 
10.3 
8.0 
6.8 
6.4 
9.7 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
8.5 
6.5 
5.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
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3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
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Bundesbank Lending to Credit Institutions, 
deflated by wholesale prices 
Index of Net Industrial Production (RH scale) 
- 87 -
Bundesbank Lending to Credit Institutions and Net Industrial Production 
llO 
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Figure 4.2 
Bank Lending to industrial enterprises and individuals % change 
over one year ago 12 months mov. average deflated by wholesale prices 
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Since during stimulative periods the banks did not exhaust their 
lending potential, it can be surmised that in those periods the cor-
relation between central bank lending and bank lending on the one hand 
and industrial production on the other was caused basically by develop-
ments in the real economy, in the sense that the banking system provided 
the loans which were demanded at given rates of interest (horizontal 
supply schedule). During periods of restrictive monetary policy, 
the Bundesbank constrained the banks to reduce their supply of bank 
loans, so that their supply schedule shifted upwards to the left. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that according to Figure 4.1 
the reduction in the Bundesbank•s lending to the credit institutions 
in 1972/73 preceded the decline in production in 1974. Figure 4.2 
suggests that the upturn in production in the period 1976/77 (a move 
out of the recession) preceded an increase in bank lending. 
4.5 The Bundesbank•s restrictive policy of 1973 
A brief description of the implementation of a restrictive policy 
may convey not only how the BundesbanK tried to put its ideas into 
practice, but also how the dilemma between external and internal equili-
~ium continued to bedevil them. When on 19 March 1973 the OM was 
floated, and thus the Bank released from its obligation to buy USA dollars 
in support of the rate of exchange between the dollar and the OM, the 
Bank set out to regain full control of internal monetary development. 
The preceding year had been a boom year, with both the current and 
the capital account of the balance of payments in surplus and the money 
supply, as measured by Ml,rising rapidly. 
The Bank•s first move was to raise the minimum reserve ratios on 
domestic liabilities, retroactively, as from 1 March. This was followed 
quickly by increases in the rediscount rate and the Lombard rate. 
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On l June the Bank stopped granting Lombard loans. In January 1973 
the Bank had already decided to lower the rediscount quotas by 10 percent 
with effect from l March. To counter excessive fluctuations in interest 
rates on the money market (the day-to-day rate had been as high as 
40 percent on certain days), the Bank introduced new fine-tuning devices. 
In April 1973, the credit institutions were notified that they could 
sell commercial bills of exchange, eligible for rediscount, to the Bank 
under repurchase agreement, for a period of 10 days, at an interest 
rate of 12 percent, the rediscount rate being 5 percent at that time. 
This facility has been made available for short periods only. The 
highest rate of interest recorded for this facility was 16 percent 
per annum in the first week of September 1973, when the rediscount rate 
stood at 7 percent. In order to moderate swings in interest rates, 
the Bundesbank sold Treasury Bills, running for fixed periods of 5 and 
10 days, to credit institutions at very low rates of interest, for short 
periods in August and October 1973. Since the bills concerned were 
not included in the Bank's money market regulating arrangements, they 
had to be kept till maturity. With effect from 1 October 1973, the 
use of rediscount quotas was lowered from a general level of 60 percent 
to levels ranging from 45 to 60 percent, depending on the amount of 
capital and reserves of the credit institutions. On 1 November 1973, 
minimum reserve ratios for sight and time deposits were raised again, 
by 3 percent. 
So as to discourage further inflows of foreign funds, the Bank decided 
at the same time to reduce the basis from which increases in external 
liabilities, subject to reserve requirements, were to be calculated. 
A similar move had been made at the end of June 1973. 
The combined effect of the measures outlined must have been a 
considerable increase in the marginal cost of central bank finance 
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for the credit institutions [3]. 
During November 1973 overseas investors started to withdraw capital 
from Germany. In order to help the credit institutions to overcome 
liquidity problems, resulting from this withdrawal, the Bundesbank re-
introduced Lombard loans, albeit at a high rate of interest (13 percent) 
and repayable at one day•s notice. For the same reason, the limits 
on the use of rediscount quotas were raised again by 15 percent, so 
that they varied between 60 and 75 percent of the official quotas. 
The restrictive domestic policy had to be mitigated, therefore, on account 
of external factors. 
It is interesting to note that the Bundesbank did not allow the 
withdrawal of capital to be reflected in a depreciation of the currency. 
Most likely it wanted to maintain the appreciation that had occurred 
in order to moderate price increases and to eliminate the undervaluation 
of the D-Mark (see chapter two). 
4.6 The effectiveness of the Bundesbank•s interest rate policies 
A critical question for a monetary policy which acts on the marginal 
cost of central bank finance is whether and, if so, how quickly the 
credit institutions will adjust their interest rates accordingly. 
As argued above, a pol ·icy to restrain a boom is more likely to generate 
the intended response than a policy to combat a recession. Nevertheless, 
[3] The increases in minimum reserve ratios meant that for a given 
expansion of bank liabilities subject to minimum reserve requirements 
more money had to be deposited at the central bank (loss of 
income). Cuts in rediscount quotas implied that the banks 
could obtain less central bank finance at the rediscount rate 
and had to apply sooner for special central bank credit. As 
Lombard credit was suspended, the required funds had to be borrowed 
in the money market at very high rates of interest. There were 
also major increases in the rediscount rate. The increases in 
minimum reserve ratios and the cuts in the rediscount quotas were 
estimated by the Bundesbank to have tied up about OM 14.9 billion 
(compared with OM 44 billion required reserves at the end of 1972). 
Thus, the cost of central bank finance required to finance a given 
expansion of bank liabilities had increased markedly. 
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the question should be asked why a bank should pay heed to a restrictive 
central bank interest rate policy. 
If it is assumed that a bank expands its lending to the point where 
its marginal revenue equals its marginal costs, then an increase in 
the rediscount rate or in the minimum reserve ratios will hit hardest 
when the bank is very close to its equilibrium point . The bank must 
then decide whether to reduce its lending or to raise its loan rates 
or to reduce its deposit rates. 
In practice, it is difficult to determine when the equilibrium 
point is reached. Something can be l earnt, however, from the margin 
a bank has between its loan and deposit rates or between its loan rates 
and the yields it could earn by investing in financial assets [4]. 
In general, the smaller these margins are, the more successful the 
central bank's interest rate policies are likely to be. Should the 
margins be high, then the bank might give priority to maintaining its 
market share and could thus respond to a restrictive policy by increasing 
its deposit rates more rapidly than its loan rates, so as to attract 
a higher volume of deposits. 
Figure 4.3 reproduces the margin between the credit institutions' 
highest lending rate and their deposit rate for time deposits with a 
term of three months, as well as the Bundesbank's rediscount rate. 
Clearly, the margin was squeezed when the rediscount rate was raised 
both in 1972/73 and in 1979. In each case the deposit rate was adjusted 
more rapidly than the loan rate. Similarly, during the recession of 
1974/75, the deposit rate was lowered more quickly than the loan rate. 
Figure 4.4 shows a similar picture for the margin between the highest 
[4] Neubauer, W. [1972], p.223. 
11. 
0 
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Figure 4.3 
Highest bank debit rate of interest less highest 
rate for time deposits 3 months 
D. Bundesbank Rediscount Rate 
• n '71 
Margin between Banks' Loan Rate and Banks' Deposit Rate 1972-1979 
10 
l. 
0 
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Figure 4.4 
Highest bank debit rate of interest less money market 
rate 3 months paper 
Bundesbank Discount Rate 
~argin Banks' Loan Rate and Rate 3 Months Money Market Paper 
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lending rate and the money market rate for three months• paper. The 
latter, of course, is the rate as it is determined by demand and supply 
on the money market. Figure 4.5 sets out the margin between the banks• 
highest loan rate and the Bundesbank•s selling rate for Treasury Bills 
of 60-90 days, an administered rate, therefore. In July 1973 the 
Bundesbank raised this rate from 6.75 percent to 7 percent, which compared 
with 2.75 percent a year ago. The rate for 3 months money market 
paper had reached 14.3 percent in July 1973, compared with 4.65 percent 
a year ago. After July 1973, the banks• loan rate was increased further 
to reach a peak of 15 percent in December 1973. The money market rates, 
however, either remained stable or declined a little subsequent to 
July 1973. There was, therefore, a lag between the time when the money 
market was tightened and the time these pressures were translated into 
higher loan rates. This lag explains the rising margin in Figure 4.5 
during the second half of 1973. 
Figure 4.6 sets out the margin between the credit institutions• 
lending rates and the interest rate charged to prime borrowers of three-
months Eurodollar loans with DM forward exchange rate cover [5]. 
Since 1973, the margin has narrowed considerably., indicating a progressive 
integration of the two markets. 
The importance of the credit institutions• interest rate margins 
for the transmission of monetary policies can easily be established 
with reference to the situation confronting the Bundesbank at the end 
of March 1979, when it was in the process of carrying out a restrictive 
monetary policy. The main features were: 
a. A positive margin of 3.6 percent between the Eurodollar short-term 
[5] Letter from the Bundesbank reproduced in Appendix 2. 
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Figure 4.5 
Highest Bank Debit Rate of Interest less Bundesbank's 
Selling Rate for Treasury Bills 60-90 days 
----- Bundesbank Discount Rate 
lo %, 
l 
Margin Banks' Loan Rate and Bundesbank Selling Rate Treasury Bills 
60-90 days 
•• 
4 
l 
0 
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Figure 4.6 
Bundesbank Rediscount Rate 
Highest Bank Debit Rate of Interest less Rate for Prime Borrowers 
of Eurodollar Loans with OM Forward Exchange Cover 
'lS 
Margin Banks' Loan Rate and Prime Borrowers' Rate Eurodollar Loans 
with OM Forward Exchange Cover 1972-1979 
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rate, corrected for forward coverage, and the credit institutions• 
loan rates. 
b. A positive margin of about 5.5 percent between the credit institutions• 
loan rates and the very short-term money market rates. 
c. A margin of 4 percent between the loan rates and three months money 
market paper, the margin showing a decreasing trend. 
d. A similar margin between the credit institutions• loan and deposit 
rates. 
e. A low 2.8 percent ratio of free liquid reserves to CBMS. 
A restrictive policy would, therefore, be able to push up money 
market interest rates rather rapidly. The Bank could not expect, 
however, that the credit institutions would respond by increasing their 
loan rates accordingly. The boom presented, no doubt, lucrative lending 
opportunities. In order to maintain their liquidity and ability to 
lend, the credit institutions would be more likely to raise their deposit 
rates more rapidly. This is precisely what they did. The deposit 
rate for time deposits with a term of three months was raised from 
4.5 percent in January 1979 to 9.5 percent in December of the same year, 
whereas the highest loan rate went from 8.25 percent to 11.25 percent 
during the same period. 
Table 4.8 indicates that the rate of bank lending was increasing 
during 1979. As a result of the sharp rise in deposit rates, the amount 
of term deposits, with terms less than four years (i.e . M2- Ml) rose 
markedly during 1979, whereas the amount of Ml decelerated. Consequently, 
the Bundesbank•s restrictive policy had more impact on the composition 
of the liabilities side than on the assets side of the banks• balance 
sheets. Table 4.8 shows that the Bundesbank•s restrictive policy 
of 1973 had similar effects, the only difference being that the rate 
of bank lending decelerated. Both in 1973 and in 1979, the credit 
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Table 4.8 
Movements in Bank Lending and in Monetary Aggregates 1972-1979 
~~r~~~!~9~-~~~~g~~-i~_lg_~2~!~~~-~2Yi~9-~Y~r~g~~!-2Y~r_Q~~-~~~r-~92 
A. Total Bank Lending to Domestic Non-Credit Institutions 
End of 
March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1972 
12.3 
13.4 
14. 1 
14.4 
1973 
14.8 
14.6 
14.2 
13.5 
1974 
12. 1 
10.8 
9.6 
8.8 
1975 1976 
8.1 9. 0 
7.8 10.1 
7.5 11.3 
8.0 11.4 
1977 1978 
11.0 9.3 
10.5 9.4 
9.6 10.0 
9.4 10.5 
B. Monetary Capital Formation, incl. All Savings Deposits 
March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
C. Ml 
March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
4.0 
7.6 
11.3 
14.6 
13.0 
13.2 
13.3 
13.6 
15. 1 
14.7 
13.7 
12.8 
13.5 
12.4 
9.2 
5.7 
11.8 10.0 
11.0 11.1 
10.5 12.6 
10.0 14.4 
2.9 8.7 
1.7 11.2 
3.5 12.6 
6.0 14.1 
15.6 
15.3 
14.5 
13.3 
14.9 
14.5 
13.3 
10.4 
12.0 
11.1 
10.2 
9.5 
9.0 
8.7 
8.7 
8.7 
8.4 9.7 
7.1 11.4 
6.7 12.5 
8.0 13.3 
D. M2 - Ml (term deposits with a term of less than 4 years) 
March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
15.2 
12.7 
14.9 
15.5 
18.7 
25.7 
31.3 
36.5 
36.3 1.9 -19.7 
30.8 - 7.3 -16.1 
20.6 -13.1 -10.0 
10.3 -16.9 - 2.4 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports 
5.1 
8.8 
9.5 
8.7 
7.9 
6.6 
7.3 
8.9 
1979 
11.1 
11.8 
12.0 
12. 1 
8.9 
9.0 
9.1 
9.1 
12.6 
11.5 
9.8 
7.5 
11.1 
14.9 
17. 1 
16.6 
institutions had margins which allowed them to give priority to serving 
their clients• demand for finance. The Bundesbank•s policy would have 
had a more direct impact on loan interest rates if the margins of the 
credit institutions had been lower. The conclusion is that the Bundesbank•s 
policy of meeting a higher demand for central bank finance at higher 
marginal costs has not been a major constraint on the credit institutions• 
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lending during periods of high economic activity. The higher costs 
of central bank finance are passed on to customers with a time lag 
which is a function of the margin between the credit institutions• 
loan and deposit rates. 
4.7 The functioning of money 
The acid test of a central bank•s policies is how well they help 
to maintain and improve the functioning of money. 
Putting it in the form of a question: does the economy draw all 
the benefits from the use of money which it is able to provide? 
a) Money as a means of payment 
Table 4.9 sets out the extent to which use has been made of 
finance provided by the banking system. 
Table 4.9 
Selected Items of the Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System 
1972-1979 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
OM Billion Percentages 
End of 1972 1974 1975 1978 1979 1972 1974 1975 1978 1979 
Claims on 
Public Auth. ll2.4 142.8 197.4 285.3 311.7 16.5 17.5 21.9 23.5 23.1 
Claims on Priv. 
Sector Total 569.3 672.1 703.2 926.7 1039.5 83.5 82.5 78.1 76.5 76.9 
Total All 
Claims 681.7 814.9 900.6 1212.0 1351.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Short-term 
Claims on 
Private 
Sector 155.9 179.7 171.2 205.6 236.5 127.4 26.7 24.3 22.2 22.8 
1Short-term claims on private sector as a percentage of total claims 
on the private sector. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports 
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Not surprisingly, the Bundesbank became increasingly 
concerned about developments in public finance. 
In 1977 the Bank complained about the large size of the 
projected public sector deficit of 4.5 percent of GNP [6]. 
The next year it pointed out that a bunching of public 
and private demand in the construction market had been responsible 
for increased costs and prices in that sector and that there were narrow 
limits to 'a policy of boosting economic activity in Germany by expanding 
public capital investment ... ' [7]. In 1979 it warned of the dangers 
of public deficits remaining high, while the economic situation was 
improving [8]. 
The need to combat the recession of 1974/1975 probably 
warranted an increase in the money supply beyond the growth rate of 
industrial production. Nevertheless, the overall impression is that 
the actual rise of 9.8 percent compound was too large compared with the 
compound growth rate of industrial production of 2.3 percent. 
b) The liquidity function of money 
Table 4.10 shows that the amount of primary liquidity 
(Ml) per head of the population has been increasing rapidly since the 
second half of 1974. Over the whole period there was an increase in 
real terms of 44 percent. This suggests that Ml has been used not only 
as a means of payment, but also as a means of preparing for future 
payments. 
[6] Bundesbank, AR 1977, p. ll. 
[7] Bundesbank, AR 1978, p.l8. 
[8] Bundesbank, MR December 1979, p.2l. 
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Table 4.10 
The Use of t~l for L i qui di ty Purposes 
Ml (12 months moving average) per head of the population and corrected 
f2~-~~~~g~~-!~-!~~-~2~~-2f_~!~!~9_!~9~~-i~ll_§~2~e~2 _________________ _ 
End 1971 = 100 
End of 
Dec. 1971 100.0 June 1976 118.3 
June 1972 103.5 June 1977 122.1 
June 1973 109.1 June 1978 131 . 7 
June 1974 103.4 June 1979 143.8 
June 1975 108.4 Dec. 1979 144.0 (est. ) 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthl~ Reports. Population estimates 
are only available for the middle of the year. 
It should be noted that the long-term rate of interest 
rose sharply in 1973/74 and declined in 1975-1978. The decrease in 
the opportunity costs of holding cash balances could explain the sharp 
rise in the period 1975-1979. The ratio of Ml to GNP, as set out in 
Table 4.11, also suggests this. 
Table 4.11 
The Ratio of Ml to GNP (at market prices) and the Ratio of Currency 
----------------------~2_g~~~~9_g~e2~!~~---------------------------
Year Ml/GNP 1 % Currency/Demand Deposits 2 % 
1972 14 34 
1973 14 34 
1974 14 34 
1975 14.5 33 
1976 15 32 
1977 15 33 
1978 16 33 
1979 16 33 
1Ml is calculated from 12 months moving averages as: ~(end year 1 + end year 0). 
2 Calculated as average of 4 end-of-quarter ratios. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports 
- 103 -
The ratio of currency to demand deposits has been remarkably 
stable. The absolute amount of currency in circulation has increased 
considerably, but not at a faster rate than the amount of sight deposits. 
There is no evidence that sight deposits have been transformed into coins 
and banknotes so as to spend money at a faster rate. The large amount 
of real money balances means that, on the assumption of a continuing moderate 
rate of inflation, economic subjects have considerable spending power. 
The Bundesbank has certainly recognised the danger to price stability 
this involves. It described this development as •excessive monetary 
growth• [9] and as •a growing danger of the 11 monetary cloak .. of the economy 
becoming too large in the long run• [10], so that there is a risk of • ... 
the monetary side no longer curbing an excessive growth of demand and thus 
a future rise in prices• [11]. This suggests that the Bundesbank•s meta-
phor of the .. monetary cloak .. refers to money•s liquidity function. 
c) Money substitutes 
The Bundesbank has observed that inflation or 
expected inflation tends to stimulate a flight into real estate, or to 
use its own graphic description, into 11 brick-and-mortar gold or marks ... 
Thus, in 1972 it attributed a strong demand for residential property to 
the spreading of an inflation mentality [12]. The strong increase in 
[9] Bundesbank, MR February 1979, p. 12. 
[10] Bundesbank, AR 1978, p.27. 
[11 J Bundesbank, AR 1978, p.36. 
[12] Bundesbank, AR 1972, pp.3, 4. 
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interest rates in 1973 apparently helped to slow down this demand, 
but without the expectations of inflation dying out Ll3J. In 1974, 
it reported that the inflation mentality had been overcome and that 
people had started to save again [14J. For the construction industry 
this resulted in a major downturn in 1974/75. 
Table 4.10 indicates that an accumulation of real cash balances 
started in 1975/76, that is after the sharp downturn in the demand 
for real estate and after the Bundesbank's stringent monetary policy 
had quelled the 'inflation mentality•. 
During the preceding boom, real estate had not been substituted 
for financial wealth in response to an observed increase in real cash 
balances above a desired level, as the portfolio balance theory would 
have it, but rather because prices were expected to keep rising. 
Expectations of increasing inflation inspire people to reduce their 
cash balances or even to go into debt. In spite of a relatively moderate 
rate of price increases, in recent years, there are signs that the 
German public continues to fear inflation. Currently, for instance, 
German citizens are holding about OM 28 billion of gold coins, that 
is the equivalent of about 10 percent of Ml [15]. 
d) Money and prices 
Prices can be viewed as amounts of money to be paid 
for individual units of goods and services [16]. These amounts 
must be determined by economic subjects. 
[13] Bundesbank, AR 1973, p.9. 
[14] Bundesbank, AR 1974, p.l6. 
For this reason, the setting 
[15] Bundesbank, MR May 1980 art.: 'Gold Transactions in the balance 
of payments!Df the Federal Republic of Germany•, pp.27-30. 
[16] Bos, P. C. [1969], p.58. 
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of prices is to be regarded as a distinct function of money. Relative 
price changes may be beneficial when they stimulate people to under-
take new activities or to stop wasteful practices or to expand profit-
able ones. Table 4.12 attempts to pinpoint the most important relative 
price changes during 1972-1979. 
Table 4.12 
Changes in Prices During 1972-1979 
% % % 
Period Period Period 
A B c 
Price Index End 1972-1974 End 1974-1979 1972-1979 
Residential Building 1 15.6 28.5 48.5 
Producer Prices Total 1 20.3 19.1 43.2 
Import Prices 1 52.0 13.3 72.2 
Export Prices 1 24.9 16.9 46.1 
External Value DM/23 currenc ~ 28. 1 17.8 50.9 
COL A 11 Groups 1 14.7 22.8 40.9 
Services 1 15.0 27.4 46.6 
Industrial 1 15.5 22.4 41.4 
Food 1 14.8 18.3 35.8 
Rates of Wages and Salaries 1 25 . 0 37.1 71.4 
Labour Productivity 3 6.6 20.3 28.2 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthli: Re~orts 
1 Percentages calculated from 12 months moving averages. 
2 Derived from monthly averages, calculated by Bundesbank. The 
23 currencies cover Germany's major trading partners. The index 
is a weighted geometric mean and has only been available since the 
end of 1972. 
3 Real Gross Domestic Product per employed person. 
The outstanding features of the three periods considered are: 
Period A (1972-1974) 
The most striking development was, no doubt, the boom in the prices 
of raw materials on world markets, and especially the rise in the price 
of oil . 
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Period B (1975-1979) 
During this period the floating D-Mark appreciated in real terms, 
so that import prices rose much less than other prices. Noteworthy 
is also the high rise in the price of services. This was probably 
caused by the substantial increase in wage rates during this period. 
Unemployment rose from 2.6 percent (unemployed as a percentage 
of employed wage and salary earners) in 1974 to 4.7 percent in 1975 
and has since dropped slowly to 3.8 percent in 1979. The number 
of foreign workers declined from 2.3 million in 1974 to 1.9 million 
in 1978. 
Period C (1972-1979) 
Taking the review period as a whole, the substantial excess of 
wage and salary pay rates over labour productivity of, in round terms, 
about 40 percent, stands out. Secondly, on balance there was a relative 
rise in the price of imports. As noted above, this rise was concentrated 
in the early seventies. From a low of 0.9 percent of employed wage 
and salary earners in 1971, the unemployment ratio increased to a peak 
of 4.7 percent in 1975. It has declined to 3.8 percent in 1979. 
Not shown in Table 4.12 is the "real" appreciation of the D-Mark 
that is the appreciation of the DM in nominal terms corrected for 
differences in inflation rates between West Germany and its trading 
partners (relative purchasing power theory). The only statistical 
information on this is given in a diagram in the Annual Report. 
This shows an effective or real appreciation of about 10 percent 
up till the end of 1978. This average masks, no doubt, a wide variety 
of effective appreciations in terms of individual currencies. The 
effective appreciation must have put pressure on export prices. 
It has also provided for a sharper competition of imports. Both 
factors have probably created an incentive for modernisation and 
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rationalisation in industry. 
A similar impulse has been given by the marked rise in labour 
costs. Since the prices of capital goods have risen to about the 
same extent as producer prices in total, employers have had an incentive 
to replace labour by capital. 
In the longer run these developments could result in the marketing 
and production of new products. 
4.8 The appreciation of the Deutsche Mark 
The Bundesbank's attitude to the "real" appreciation of the DM 
has been ambiguous. On the one hand, the Bank analyses effects such 
as the loss of employment opportunities resulting from the decline 
of uncompetitive export industries, the growing competition from imports 
and the low profitability of export industries which endeavour to 
maintain their market shares [17]. On the other hand, the Bank dis-
cusses advantages such as lower import prices and the reduced scope 
for passing on cost increases on the domestic market and the gains 
in international productivity brought about by a better allocation 
of factors of production in the world at large and finally the maintenance 
of freedom of world trade. 
The latter two advantages are not exclusively associated with a 
regime of flexible rates of exchange. They would also result from 
a system of fixed rates of exchange, subject to periodic adjustments 
in case of fundamental disequilibria. Under such a system, an industry 
in a foreign country can just as well become competitive on the German 
market, provided there is a divergent development of prices and costs 
in the two countries. The OM was indeed revalued when fixed rates 
[17] Bundesbank, AR 1978, pp. 10, 20, 21. 
- 108 -
of exchange were maintained under the Bretton Woods Agreements. 
This leaves the advantage of lower prices. In view of the Bundesbank•s 
ultimate goal of price stability, this must certainly count as the 
major benefit of an appreciating currency. 
Generally speaking, should the OM be allowed to appreciate freely 
in real terms, then German business could be confronted with flagging 
demand for its products both at home (owing to the Bundesbank•s dis-
inflationary policies and sharper competition from imports) and abroad. 
At the same time, cost levels abroad would decline relative to costs 
in Germany in terms of the 0-Mark. This combination of factors would 
provide a strong incentive to German business to invest capital abroad, 
for example, in overseas subsidiaries or by participation in foreign 
enterprises Ll8]. This would help to maintain markets abroad in spite 
of rising cost levels in Germany. 
Although the appreciation of the 0-Mark, which had caused this 
state of affairs, would have contributed to price stability, it would 
also have had a depressing effect on employment in Germany. Price 
stability is, therefore, not always a precondition for full employment. 
This is not to deny, of course, that within Germany employment might 
rise in industries producing non-tradables, especially in the service 
industries [19]. There are indications that the Bundesbank would 
be prepared to counter the disadvantageous effects of an appreciation 
by means of reflationary monetary and fiscal measures [20]. 
[18] Bundesbank, AR 1977, p.36. 
Ll9] Bundesbank, AR 1978, p.4. 
[20] Bundesbank, AR 1977, p.2. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
During the review period, the Bundesbank was unable to offer the 
domestic credit system adequate protection against external monetary 
disturbances. Relatively large public sector deficits, and wage rises 
substantially in excess of labour productivity, aggravated its task 
of maintaining monetary stability. 
The speed at which the Bundesbank's increases in the marginal cost 
of central bank finance are transmitted to the loan and deposit rates 
of the credit institutions is a function of the credit institutions' 
margin between these two rates. The higher this margin is, the more 
severe the central bank's monetary policy should be if it wants to 
achieve a reduction in the demand for bank credit. The banks tend 
to adjust their deposit rates sooner than their loan rates with a 
view to maintaining their market shares. 
With the exception of two periods of restrictive monetary policies, 
1973/74 and 1979, the credit institutions did not exhaust their potential 
for making bank loans. This implies that, with the exception of the 
two periods just mentioned, changes in bank liabilities (including the 
money supply, Ml) were endogenous. 
During the review period, a progressive integration of the domestic 
market for bank loans and the Eurocurrency markets could be observed. 
The increase in the volume of money (Ml) appeared to be too high 
for the functioning of money as a means of payment. Especially since 
1975, large balances of Ml were held as a store of value. During 
the boom period of 1972-1974, there was a marked tendency to invest 
in real estate as an alternative store of value. With regard to money's 
pricing function, there were some significant changes in relative prices 
during the period considered, notably increases in wages in excess of 
increases in labour productivity, increases in the prices of raw materials 
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during the early seventies, and a 11 real 11 appreciation of the 0-Mark 
between 1975 and 1979. The Bundesbank•s attitude to a 11 real 11 appreciation 
of the 0-Mark appears to be ambiguous. On the one hand, it recognises 
the structural problems it entails, such as a loss of employment oppor-
tunities, but on the other hand, it values its moderating effects on 
internal prices. 
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CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY: A CONJECTURED REACTION FUNCTION 
5.1 Assessment of a qualitative reaction function 
This study has attempted to assess the Bundesbank•s qualitative 
reaction function, understood as its basic view as to how the monetary 
sector should be controlled in order to achieve the ultimate goals 
of economic policy: price stability, economic growth, equilibrium 
in the balance of payments and full employment. 
Such a view is necessarily broad and should not be confused with 
a theoretical concept. 
Although the views of a central bank are influenced by the results 
of theoretical economic studies, the theoretical preferences of its 
policymakers tend to be eclectic, their choices depending, amongst 
others, on the institutional framework in which they are operating 
and the prevailing economic situation. One reason for this is that 
central banks are called upon to carry out their monetary policy in 
a market place which is part of a wide historic and institutional setting. 
Consequently, an exploration of a ·central bank•s institutional 
setting should be just as important as a study of its publications, 
if its qualitative reaction function is to be assessed. 
A central bank•s publications may be analysed from a variety of 
viewpoints. This study has made use of the theory of economic policy 
as developed by Tinbergen and adopted for monetary policy by Brunner 
and Meltzer. It requires the identification of policy instruments, 
operating target, intermediate target, policy indicator and ultimate 
goals. In addition, attention has been paid to the Bundesbank•s 
views on the functions of money on the assumption that a central bank 
will be interested in seeing to it that, for its part, money functions 
in an optimal manner. Moreover, preference for a particular function 
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may point to a certain theoretical predilection. 
The Bundesbank•s preference for monetary systems, for instance, 
flexible or fixed rates of exchange, has also been looked at briefly. 
5.2 Social market economy and sound money 
Important features of the West German institutional Tamework are, 
first, the concept of a social market economy in which the State is 
expected to establish the social and other conditions, including 
11 SOund money .. , which would allow free markets to· perform best. This 
has led to various pragmatic economic policies, for example in the 
form of major interventions in the free flow of capital into Germany 
in order to preserve internal monetary stability [lJ. 
Second, two disastrous hyperinflations, in 1919-1923 and 1944-1947, 
have had a large imprint on the public•s attitudes and expectations. 
This is certainly the political reason for the primacy of the goal 
of price stability and the independence of the Bundesbank. In the 
Bundesbank•s view, price stability is, in fact, the key to the attain-
ment of a high level of employment and economic growth [2j. 
5.3 Austrian theory of capital and liquidity theory of money 
The abhorrence of inflation may also be the reason for the Bundesbank•s 
preference for the monetary theories associated with the Austrian 
theory of capital [K. Wicksell, L. von Mises and F. A. von Hayek] [3]. 
In spite of differences between these theories, they share a strong 
preference for price stability or 1neutral money. They see inflation 
[1] See Section 2.1, pp. 20-22. 
[2] See Section 3.10, pp. 76, 77. 
[3] See Section 3.10, pp. 76, 77. 
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as caused by the banks' loan rate of interest dropping below the natural 
rate. The ensuing increase in the demand for bank loans serves to 
finance a volume of investment projects which cannot be financed out 
of voluntary savings. Consequently, the prices of finished products 
and labour will rise and an 11 inflation mentality .. may arise which leads 
to unproductive speculative buying of real estate, land and so on. 
Continuing price rises will increase economic uncertainty and discourage 
productive long-term investment. 
To prevent such a sequence of events, monetary policy should constrain 
the demand for bank credit by controlling the banks' loan rate of 
interest, making sure that it is as close as possible to the marginal 
productivity of new investment projects (i.e. the natural rate). 
Another major school of thought which has had an impact on the 
Bundesbank's views is the 11 liquidity theory of money... It stresses 
that monetary policy should only finance a volume of demand which 
corresponds to the supply of real output. The Bundesbank's monetary 
target approach has been inspired by this view L4]. 
5.4 The Bundesbank's view of the transmission process 
Figure 5.1 sets out schematically the Bundesbank's view on the 
transmission process of its monetary policies. For ease of exposition, 
it is assumed that the credit system is perfectly insulated against 
inflows of foreign capital. 
A hypothetical case may illustrate the operation of the Bundesbank's 
policies. 
L4] See Section 1.3, pp. 3-6. 
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At the beginning of each year the Bank determines a monetary growth 
target, defined as a percentage growth rate of the Central Bank Money Stock 
(CBMS), this being the sum of the banks' required reserve holdings cal-
culated at constant (January 1974) minimum reserve ratios, augmented with 
the sum of currency in the hands of the public [5]. 
This target serves as a guideline for employers, trade unions and 
the government to help them to determine their bargaining stance, budgets, 
investment planning and so on [6]. They know that compliance with the 
target means that they will be able to obtain the finance they require 
at given interest rates. Should they exceed the target, then the Bundesbank 
would implement a more restrictive policy, so that bank credit would 
become more expensive and more difficult to obtain. This could result 
in the crowding out of the planned expenditures of groups which had not 
violated the growth target. 
The need for and form of a more restrictive monetary policy is assessed 
on the basis of two criteria. First, the development of the monetary 
growth target. Second, the amount of free liquid reserves expressed 
as a percentage of central bank money. If the latter is high, then 
measures are called for to eliminate the credit institutions• free liquid 
reserves, in order to put the Bank into a position which allows it to 
set the conditions on which the banks may obtain central bank finance 
to expand their lending [7]. 
The Bundesbank's concern that the credit institutions should not 
be able to rely on a bufferstock of free liquid reserves as a source of 
[5] See Section 3.7, pp. 62-69 
[6] See p. 69 
[7] See Section 3.2, pp. 45, 46. 
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central bank money points to an influence of the liquidity theory of 
money [8]. 
The credit institutions could be compelled to liquidate their free 
liquid reserves by increases in the minimum reserve ratios, reductions 
in the rediscount quotas, restrictions on the availability of Lombard 
credit, more stringent criteria for eligible bills of exchange, a smaller 
range of money market paper which the Bank is obliged to buy back at any 
time, the issue of mobilisation and liquidity paper and a refusal to 
shift balances of the public sector from the Bundesbank to the credit 
institutions [9]. 
The resulting squeeze on bank liquidity pushes up money market interest 
rates. In turn, this raises the marginal cost of any additional central 
bank money required by the credit institutions if they continue to expand 
their lending. Sooner or later this will force the banks to adjust 
their loan rates [10]. In fact, an increase in minimum reserve ratios, 
without any accompanying measures, would already provide an incentive 
to the banks to raise their loan rates, because it requires them to keep 
more funds in non-interest bearing accounts. The rise in money market 
interest rates is then reinforced by appropriate changes in the Bank•s 
interest rate policy instruments. The rediscount rate and the Lombard 
rate will be raised in any case. For instance, if the banks had initially 
a large unutilised rediscount quota, which would not be wiped out entirely 
by quota reductions, then the banks would be able to borrow central bank 
finance at a relatively low rate by rediscounting bills. A rise in the 
[8] See pp. 45, 46. 
[9] See Section 2.6, pp. 30-35. 
[10] See Section 3.2, pp. 45-49. 
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rediscount rate would prevent this. Moreover, increases in the rediscount 
rate have an impact on bank lending rates, especially on shorter-term 
rates [11]. 
Should the restrictive policy become really severe and result in 
very sharp interest rate movements in the money market, then the Bank 
could employ the device of repurchase agreements to stabilise the market. 
In general, the credit institutions do not respond immediately 
to more expensive central bank money by raising their lo an rates of 
interest. They will do so with a time lag which depends on the spread 
between their loan and deposit rates Ll2]. 
How soon the volume of bank lending will react to an increase 
in loan rates depends on the margin between the loan rates and the 
natural rate of interest Ll3J. It is worth pointing out that the 
latter may be influenced by decisions on wages and prices which the 
Bank attempts to control via its monetary growth target. 
The rise in money market interest rates has also an impact on 
the capital market. In order to obtain short-term finance, the banks 
are likely to sell bonds from their portfolios, so that capital market 
rates go up. This, in turn, affects interest rates charged, for 
instance, for long-term mortgages. In addition, a rise in capital 
market rates enables the banks to offer better terms for long-term 
funds (monetary capital formation). The Bundesbank favours the latter, 
because it tends to reduce household sector liquidity, as funds are 
deposited long-term at the banks [14]. 
L 11 J See PP . 48, 49. 
L 12] See Section 4.6, pp. 91-100. 
L13] See Section 3.5a, pp. 56-58. 
[14] See Section 3.3a, pp. 50-52. 
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A high interest rate policy would thus improve the supply of 
funds to the capital market (with a time lag). Interestingly, the 
Bundesbank is also involved in the administration of the demand for 
long-term funds in the bond market Ll5J and it could use its influence 
in this way to enforce its monetary policy. The combination of a 
reduction in the volume of bank lending and an increase in monetary 
capital formation has the effect of reducing the money supply M3 and 
hence, via the operation of the minimum reserve ratios, the central 
bank money stock. 
In this context, monetary capital formation functions as a device 
to control the growth of the money stock supply Ll6J. As such it is 
a surrogate for large-scale open-market operations, which are ruled 
out owing to the small size of financial markets in Germany Ll7]. 
The Bundesbank sees the money stock supply as important in its 
own right. Once money has entered the system, its utilisation can vary 
greatly and produce undesirable income flows of money Ll8J. 
The Bank favours the broader monetary aggregate, M3, as policy 
target, because it is relatively immune to changes in the holdings 
of money and financial assets induced by changes in interest rates and, 
therefore, a better indica tor of what it ca 11 s 11 the monetary trend 11 • 
Its view in this respect is influenced by the concept of a demand for 
money to hold (portfolio balance theory) Ll9]. 
An important feature of the Bundesbank's view of the transmission 
[15] See Section 2.9, pp.38-41. 
[16] See Section 2.7, pp.35-36. 
[17] See Section 2.7, pp.35-36. 
[18] See Section 3.5b, pp.58, 59. 
[19] See Section 3.6, pp.59-62. 
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process is that it cannot be characterised in terms of one specific 
intermediate variable. As Figure 5.1 indicates, the Bank sees the 
monetary sector as an interlocking system of financial variables and 
financial markets. Thus the money stock supply (M3) is thought of as 
a function of the volume of bank lending, the amount of cash balances 
of the public authorities, the inflow of foreign exchange and monetary 
capital formation [20]. 
Another instance is the interrelationship between the money market 
and the bond market. As the banks are major operators in both, this 
interrelationship is indeed a close one, especially at the shorter end 
of the bond market. In this connection, the Bundesbank's belief that 
the bond market is segmented is quite plausible, because the credit 
institutions will be concerned to tailor their liabilities to their 
assets [21]. 
An important implication of the interlocking character of the 
monetary sector is that the Bundesbank's policies are more complex than 
suggested above. In general, the Bank aims at those intermediate 
targets which appear to require most attention in the light of the 
economic situation, whilst it imposes side conditions on other financial 
variables [22]. The account given of the Bank's view of the transmission 
process has assumed that the domestic credit system was completely 
insulated against inflows of foreign capital. In the Bundesbank's 
concept such an insulation should be ensured by means of a system of 
flexible rates of exchange. In this, it is constrained, of course, 
by international agreements such as the European Monetary System. 
[20] See Section 3.4, pp.53-56. 
[21] See Section 3.8, pp. 69-73and Section 3.9, pp. 73-76. 
[22] See pp. 54-56, 78. 
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At any rate, the introduction of floating in 1973 has not entirely 
prevented foreign investment in OM financial assets. 
9 percent of GNP in 1974 to 13 percent in 1979 [23]. 
It rose from 
The Bundesbank would certainly welcome an appreciation of the 
currency as a means of reducing price increases. A sustained appreciation, 
however, could entail a strong incentive for German business to invest 
abroad and thus to reduce employment opportunities within Germany [24]. 
Notwithstanding its attempts to protect the domestic credit 
system against undesirable developments by means of flexible rates of 
exchange, a sufficient amount of monetary capital formation and a monetary 
targets approach, the Bank's stringent monetary policies have given rise 
to the phenomenon of parallel financial markets, that is markets which 
are not constrained by the monetary authorities. The Eurocurrency 
markets are the most important of such parallel markets. They allow 
German business to borrow at cheaper rates when German banks are forced 
to raise their loan rates as a result of the Bundesbank's monetary policy. 
In recent years, the Eurocurrency markets have become increasingly inte-
grated with the German domestic financial markets. 
The policy implication is that the Bundesbank must take into 
account the possibility that potential borrowers of funds avoid any 
restrictive policy by dealings in parallel markets L25J. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The Bundesbank's concept of the transmission process is fascinating 
in many respects. It is certainly a very coherent view. Its most 
L23] See Section 2.2, pp. 22, 23. 
[24] See Section 4.8, pp. 107-109. 
[25] See Section 2.3, pp. 23-25. 
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recent innovation, the public announcement of a monetary growth target, 
appeals directly to the responsibility of non-banks for a sound monetary 
development. Implicit in this target approach is a recognition on 
the part of the Bank that the setting of prices and wage rates is a 
distinct function of money. 
At the same time the target enhances the effectiveness of the 
Bundesbank's policy instruments. The transmission process itself is, 
therefore, not altered but rather reinforced by the target approach. 
It continues to rely on bringing about changes in the profitability 
of banking, and hence in the costs of borrowing, as well as in the rates 
of return on saving. 
In the Bundesbank's view money ought to be managed in the public 
interest if inflation is to be avoided. It has an impressive range 
of policy instruments at its disposal to manage effectively. There 
can be no doubt about its determination to use these instruments. 
The more effective it is, however, the more incentives it provides to 
a flexible, innovative and internationally oriented financial system 
to avoid its constraints. From this point of view, it can be expected 
that the Bundesbank will seek to achieve its aims increasingly through 
international co-operation with international financial institutions, 
other central banks and governments. 
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Frankfurt om Ma in 
June 26, 1980 
We should like to thank you for your interest in the policy of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank and are pleased to give you the desired infor-
mation. Two Acts of Parliament are of basic importance for the 
functions and legal status of the Bundesbank in the political 
system of the Federal Republic of Germany: the 11 Deutsche Bundesbanl: 
Act" of 1957 and the "Act to Promote Stability and Growth of the 
Economy" of 1967. According to these Acts it is the primary 
function of monetary policy to safeguard the stability of the 
currency. At the same time, the Bundesbank is required to support 
the general economic policy of the government, but only in so far 
as is compatible with the fulfilment O! its stability function. 
Control of the money stock in accordance with primarily domestic 
targets became possible in Germany with the floating of the 
exchange rate of the Deutsche Mark in March 1973, i.e. the obli-
gation to intervene against the dollar cease~ to exist and 
interventions were only necessary in the currencies of the countrie · 
of the European bloc. The Bundesbank then concretised its stabili ty 
function for the first time for 1975 by fixing a monetary target. 
It chose for its target the central bank money stock, by which it 
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DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK Frankfurt om Moin, June 26, 1980 Blatt 2 
Emptonaer Mr. P. Simons, Wellington North, Neuse eland 
understands - broadly speaking - currency in circulation plus 
the banks' required minimum reserves on domestic liabilities (at 
constant reserve ratios). The choice of the central bank money 
stock as the key indicator and intermediate target variable has 
often led to misunderstandings. The concept of the central bank 
money stock is frequently construed as a special variant of the 
. . 
concept of the monetary base, but the central bank money stock 
' does not describ~ the creation of central bank money as a 
"stimulus" to monetary growth (like the monetary base), but its 
use ln the form of the Bundesbank's liabilities to non-banks 
and banks arising from currency in circulation and required 
minimum reserves after the completion of the money creation 
process. In the last few years the manner in which the target 
is formulated has been changed on several occasions. Since the 
end of 1978 it has been formulated in terms of a range; the 
lateat target is to keep the expansion of the central bank money 
stock between the fourth quarter of 1979 and the fourth quarter 
of 1980 within a range of 5 % to 8 %. More detailed information 
on the Bundesbank's monetary policy will be found in the booklet 
11 Die wahrungspolitischen Institutionen und Instrumente in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland", which is enclosed with this letter. 
It goes without saying that there is a continuous informal 
exchange of ideas between the Bundesbank on the one hand and 
academic and political circles on the other. It would, however, 
be inappropriate to assign the Bundesbank's monetary policy 
concept simply to a particular academic school of thought. It 
differs from strict monetarism, for instance, in that it does 
not reject outright the discretionary use of monetary policy. 
From the mass of literature dealing with the Bundesbank's 
monetary policy concept we can only give a small selection here, 
on the assumption that at least some of these works are avail-
able in your country: 
-3-
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frnpfOnger IVJ.r. P. Simons, Wellington North, r~euseeland 
H. Bockelmann: "Streitfragen zur Kontrolle der Geldschop-
fung durch die Notenbank" in: Probleme der Geldmengen-
steuerung by W. Ehrlicher and A. Oberhauser (publishers), 
Schriften des Vereins flir Socialpolitik, N.F., Vol. 99, 
Berlin 1978. 
H. B5ckelmann: "Quantitative Targets for monetary Policy 
in Germany", Cahiers economiques et ·monetaires No. 6, 
Actes du se~inalre des Banques Centrales et des Institutions 
Internationales - Paris Avril 1977, Banque de France. 
D. Dickertmann and A. Siedenberg: Instrumentarium der 
Geldpolitik (3rd revised and extended edition), DUsseldorf 
1979. 
H.-J. Jarchow: Theorie und Politik des Geldes 
II. ·Geldmarkt und geldpoli tische Instrumente (2nd revised 
and extended edition), Gottingen 1976. 
H. Schlesinger: "Neuere Erfahrungen der Geldpolitik in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland", Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 9, 
1976, No. 4. 
Yours faithfully, 
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
Enclosures 
Note: None of the books is available in New Zealand! [P.S.] The 
journal "Kredit und Kapital " is held by Auckland University Library 
only . 
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Frankfurt am Main 
August 7, 1980 
The Euro-dollar interest rates shown in our Monthly Reports in the 
table "Money market rates in foreign countries• (V,8) are quota-
tions for interbank deposits in the Euro-dollar market (average of 
buying and selling rates). The costs of dollar loans to non-banks 
rise by the relevant surcharges for non-banks; we do not, however, 
carry any statistics on these. 
The rates for Euro-~ deposits in the interbank market can be 
derived from the Euro-dollar rates and the corresponding swap rates, 
as the following applies with free interest rate arbitrage in the 
Euro-market: 
Euro-DM interest rate • Euro-dollar interest rate + swap 
rate (as~ p.a.) 
If a non-bank surcharge of about 1/2 % fo·r prime borrowers is added 
to the Euro-DM rates, it becomes apparent that Euro-DM loans 
(or rather Euro-dollar loans with DM forward exchange cover) have 
--been cheaper in recent months than comparable domestic credits 
(see table V,6 in the Monthly Reports). 
BonkgebOude 
Wil hel m·Epstein-Stro6e 14 
f rankfurt em Ma in 
Posto nschri f t fiir We r t· 
und Eilb riefe 
W ilhelm- Epstein·Strofle 14 
6000 Fra nkfur t 50 
Telex 
4 1 227 {I n la nd) 
41227 bbk f d 
4 14 431 IAus lo nd ) 
414431 bbk f d 
Telegr a mm -
Kurzaruchrift 
NOT ENBANK 
FRANK FURT MAIN 
-2-
Ko nten 
Girolc.onto-N r./ Postsdu~ckkon to 
Bonklei tza hl {BlZ) frankfurt am Main 
504000 00 {BLZ 500 100 60) 
N r. 39 63 ·608 
- 126 -
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK Frankfurt om Main, August 7, 1980elan 2 
Emptonger Mr. P. Simons, P. 0. Box 12-294, 
Wellington North, Neuseeland 
Enclosed please find a table of Euro-DM interest rates for three-
month loans since 1972. 
Yours sincerely, 
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
Enclosure 
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APPENDIX 3 THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 
As evidence for his segmented market hypothesis, Culbertson Ll] 
found on the basis of U.S.A. data: 
short-term rates have averaged lower and have moved over a wider 
range than, but generally together with, long-term rates. 
For the period 1953 through April 1957, he derived by means of ordinary 
least squares: long-term rate = 2.3 + 0.31 short-term rate. 
Figure A3-l is a scatter diagram of long-term rates (yields on 
issue of fixed interest rate securities) and short-term rates (monthly 
averages of three months money market interest rates) during the period 
1972-1980 January. The ordinary least squares relationship is 5.8 + 0.33 
short-term rate. Apart from the intercept, this is quite close to 
Culbertson's result. The coefficient of determination is 0.56, the 
t-statistic of the coefficient of the short-term rate 10.95 and the 
standard error of estimate: 0.91 %. The Durbin-Watson statistic, 
however, is as low as 0.07. The residuals are, therefore, extremely 
autocorrelated. This is not an unusual result, as noted by Goodhart [2]. 
The Chi-Square test applied to the residuals shows likewise that they 
are by no means normally distributed. 
There are a number of reasons why autocorrelation can be expected 
to occur in data relating to financial markets. 
First, there is a fairly small number of market operators who 
tend to know each other. 
As pointed out by Haverkamp L3], they tend to react to each other's 
[1] Culbertson, J. M. [1957], p.515. 
[2] Goodhart, C. A. E. [1975], p.83. 
[3] Haverkamp, H. [1979], pp.405-42l. 
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behaviour. This can happen either positively (imitation) or negatively. 
In Haverkamp•s view the former tends to dominate. These reactions 
take time to manifest themselves. A priori it is not possible to 
say how long these lags are. 
By way of example, if some major market operators believe that 
interest rates are going to decline, they will start buying bonds. 
Within a very short time other operators may follow suit. Market 
operators will be guided not only by the actions of colleagues, but 
also by their own past experience (correlation with their own past 
behaviour). The more recent past is likely to carry a greater weight 
than the more remote. Similar lagged reactions take place between 
price movements in the money market and in the bond market in Germany. 
Bundesbank actions, for example ,an increase in the rediscount 
rate, will generate expectations of rising interest rates. These 
could induce selling on the bond market (with a time lag). 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, there is indeed a close relationship 
between the money market and the capital market in Germany. A tight 
money market may cause banks to sell bonds, again with a certain time 
lag, in order to obtain liquid funds. 
It is fair to say that the Bundesbank has more control over the 
supply of funds to the bond market (via its control over the money 
market) than over the demand for long-term funds. 
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